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 Economic reforms along with its promise of increasing income and growth 
rates have also raised concerns about its distributional implications. These concerns 
are at the heart of the arguments of those who oppose certain economic reforms. 
Focusing on the economic reforms implemented in India, we investigate the 
distributional implications of the reforms using four waves of nationally 
representative household survey data over the period 1983 to 2000. Chapter 1 
provides an overview of the economic policies in India, including a discussion of the 
reforms implemented in 1991. We also examine the economic performance across 
states and regions in India over the period 1980-2000.  
 Chapter 2 investigates the role of economic geography, as measured by 
proximity to markets and suppliers. In this chapter we ask two questions, first 
  
whether market access affects regional wage inequality and second, whether that has 
changed after the reforms in 1991 were implemented. With the deregulation of 
private sector activity implemented as a part of the reforms, location features such as 
proximity to markets and suppliers are likely to influence the location of new 
investments. The differences in spatial features contribute to the between-region 
component of the total income inequality. We find that regions closer to the ports 
have higher wages associated with them. On the other hand, greater proximity to 
domestic markets and sources of supply are not associated with higher region wage 
premia before liberalization. However, there is heterogeneity in their role over the 
time period under study. We find that post-reforms the role of domestic market and 
supply access has become stronger and they have a positive and statistically 
significant impact on wages associated with a region. The effect of greater access to 
ports does not appear to have become any stronger post-reforms. This suggests that 
the share of the between-region component in the total income inequality will be 
higher, resulting in an increase in spatial income inequality, in the post-reform period. 
 Chapter 3 eva luates empirically the impact of the dramatic 1991 trade 
liberalization in India on its industry wage structure. The empirical strategy uses the 
variation in industry wage premia and trade policy across industries and over time. 
We find a strong and robust relationship between reductions in Indian trade barriers 
and an increase in the industry wage premia over time. We also find that trade 
liberalization has led to decreased wage inequality between skilled and unskilled 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 Economic reforms along with its promise of increasing income and growth 
rates have also raised concerns about its distributional implications. These concerns 
are at the heart of the arguments of those who oppose certain economic reforms.  
 There are various reasons that make it interesting to look at the issue of 
inequality and why we care about inequality. Many economists view inequality as a 
necessary evil at worst and a “reasonable” price to pay at best for growth. Birdsall 
(2005), in an overview on the issue of inequality and development, provides the 
counter-argument that inequality is “destructive” and that it restricts growth. This is 
especially true in the case of developing countries where markets are not as 
competitive and where governments are not as effective in compensating for the 
weakness of the markets through public policy. Thus, inequality matters for growth. 
 In addition, inequality undermines good public policy—inhibiting growth 
promoting and poverty reduction policies. The rich can influence policy to maintain 
their status quo, which can be growth inhibiting. This is more so the case if there is 
concentration of income at the top, a small middle class and substantial poverty at the 
bottom. Thus, inequalities can also to lead government failure. On the other hand, 
when those disadvantaged do have a political voice, inequality increases the 
likelihood of populist programs that can make inequality worse and also restrict 
growth. 
 Also, persistent inequality can change the incentive structure of individuals. If 
there is limited vertical mobility, as is the case in developing countries, this might 




education and acquire human capital as they find themselves in a low-income trap 
across generations. This can lead to a vicious circle of low education and persistent 
income inequality. 
 Further, if income or well-being of other individuals enters our own utility 
function, disparities in incomes affects our own welfare. According to this view, an 
individual tends to view income as a measure of their worth in the society and their 
status relative to others. Increasing disparities can lead to perceptions of injustice and 
unfairness. These perceptions of increasing gaps can lead to perverse policy choices. 
 The issue of who wins and who loses as a consequence of the reforms is a 
critical one and can be analyzed from various perspectives. In this dissertation, 
focusing on the economic reforms implemented in India in 1991, we investigate this  
question along two dimensions. 
 First, in Chapter 2, we analyze whether location affects regional inequality in 
India and whether that effect was exacerbated or ameliorated by the recent economic 
reform. More specifically, we focus on the role of proximity to markets and suppliers 
in influencing the wages associated with a location. With de-licensing and 
deregulation of private manufacturing sector activity which were implemented as a 
part of the reforms, spatial features are likely to influence decision-making in the 
private sector. 
 We find regions closer to the ports have higher wages associated with them. 
On the other hand, greater proximity to domestic markets and sources of supply are 
not associated with higher region wage premia before liberalization. However, there 




reforms the role of domestic market and supply access has become stronger and they 
have a positive and statistically significant impact on wages associated with a region. 
The effect of greater access to ports does not appear to have become any stronger 
post-reforms. One possible reason we see no change in the importance of ports could 
be that India’s growth path has been unique, it has relied more on domestic markets 
than exports (Das (2006)) and external trade in India has not “taken off” in the same 
fashion as it has for China and Mexico. 
 These spatial features (i.e., proximity to ports, domestic markets and 
suppliers) contribute to the between-region component of the total income inequality. 
With no change in the role of ports and an increased importance of domestic market 
and supply access, results in Chapter 2 suggest that the share of the between-region 
component in the total income inequality will be higher, resulting in an increase in 
spatial income inequality, in the post-reform period.  
 Second, in Chapter 3 (joint with Prachi Mishra) we evaluate the impact of 
trade liberalization in India  on its industry wage structure. In the process, we also 
provide an answer to the broader question of what happened to the wage inequality 
between skilled and unskilled workers as a result of the trade reforms. The empirical 
strategy uses the variation in industry wage premia and trade policy across industries 
and over time. In contrast to most of the earlier studies on developing countries, we 
find a strong and robust relationship between reductions in the Indian trade barriers 
and an increase in the industry wage premia over time. The results are consistent with 
liberalization- induced productivity increases at the firm level, which get passed on to 




 The relationship between trade policy and industry wage premia has important 
implications for the impact of trade liberalization on wage inequality. Since different 
industries employ different shares of skilled workers, changes in industry wage 
premia translate into changes in relative incomes of skilled and unskilled workers. 
Further, the tariff reductions were relatively larger in sectors with a higher proportion 
of unskilled workers and these sectors experienced an increase in wages relative to 
other sectors, this implies that the unskilled workers experienced an increase in 
incomes relative to skilled workers. Thus, we find that trade liberalization has led to 
decreased wage inequality between skilled and unskilled workers in India through the 
wage premium channel in India. 
 We use individual level data nationally representative survey undertaken by 
the National Sample Survey Organization (NSSO) for the years 1983, 1987-88, 1993-
94 and 1999-2000 to investigate these issues. 
 The next section summarizes the main aspects of economic policy in India 
over the period 1947-2000, including a discussion of the reforms implemented in 
1991. This is followed by a discussion of economic performance across states and 
regions in India over the period 1980-2000. The chapter concludes with an overview 
of the trade policy. 
1.1 Economic Policy in India 
 Before we delve into the analysis of who wins and who loses from reforms, it 
is important to understand the economic scenario that prevailed in India prior to 
reforms. With the discussion below we hope to bring forth the point that the 




highlight the key aspects of the trade and industrial policies and the changes 
introduced in these areas. 
1.1.1 1947-1980: A Snapshot 
 In this section, we provide a brief overview of the development strategy in 
India after Independence in 1947. The discussion here presents only the main features 
and we refer the reader to some of the excellent literature on this subject for 
additional details.1 As India emerged from colonialism in 1947, under the leadership 
of Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and P. C. Mahalanobis, it embarked upon a 
socialist strategy of development which was implemented via Five-Year Plans. 
 This strategy envisaged a heavy role for the government and the public sector 
in shaping India’s economy and industrialization. Having just emerged from 
colonialism, self-sufficiency was the top most priority. This combined with the need 
to reduce dependence on foreign exchange and to channel the available resources in 
the “right” direction led to a highly restrictive trade policy and a heavily regulated 
private sector.  In addition, to achieve the goals of equality and balanced regional 
development, which could not be left to the private sector, government adopted a 
system of industrial licensing and quotas to regulate private sector activity and trade. 
The development strategy relied on a mix of import-substitution, prominent role of 
the government in providing infrastructure, creation of domestic heavy industries 
(solely reserved for the public sector in some cases), and as a regulator and provider 
(sometimes sole) of goods and services to achieve rapid industrialization. 
                                                 
1 A more detailed account can be found in the following references: Bhagwati and Desai (1970), 





 While the private sector was allowed, it was heavily regulated to be consistent 
with the overall objectives of the development strategy. Das (2002, pp. 11) 
summarizes the attitude of the government towards private sector post- independence 
by noting that, “Gandhi distrusted technology but not businessmen. Nehru distrusted 
businessmen but not technology. Instead of sorting out the contradictions, we mixed 
the two up. We have had to deal with holy cows: small companies are better than big 
ones (Gandhi); public enterprises are better than private ones (Nehru); local 
companies are better than foreign ones (both)”.  
 The industrial licensing system, started under the Industries Act (1951), 
required government permission on what (product-mix), how (input-mix so as to 
reduce dependence on foreign exchange, encourage greater domestic content and 
credit allocation), where (location), how much (expansion of existing capacities 
required permission) to produce. Thus most of the factors on which new investment 
decisions would be based were controlled by the government through licensing. This 
licensing system became a huge drag on India’s industrialization and was notoriously 
referred to as the “license raj”.2 To avoid concentration of economic activity in the 
hands of a few large industrial houses, Monopoly and Restrictive Trade Practices Act 
(MRTP) and Foreign Exchange Regulation Act (FERA) were enacted. 
 Beginning 1950, the policy of small-scale reservations was initiated to 
encourage labor intensive manufacturing in the private sector and this led to the 
emergence of the small-scale industries (SSI) sector. The incentives doled out 
included tax concessions and tax-holidays, preferential access to and subsidized 
                                                 





credit. However, the key element of this policy, introduced in 1967, was that some 
products were exclusively reserved for production by the small-scale sector. Once a 
product is classified to be produced by the small-scale sector no further capacity 
expansion was permitted for medium- or large-scale units, though they were allowed 
to produce3. All further expansion or capacity creation is reserved only for the small-
scale sector. Another special feature of the SSI policy in India is the eligibility 
criteria. While most countries define SSI in terms of employment levels, the Indian 
definition has been largely based on cumulative amount of investment in plant and 
machinery. These definitional investment limits are periodically revised upwards with 
inflation. The importance of these investment limits are clear once it is recognized 
that only those firms which have investment limits below the threshold can produce 
items reserved for the SSI. Mohan (2002) provides an excellent overview and a 
critical evaluation of the small-scale industrial policy in India. 
 As mentioned earlier, India followed a highly restrictive trade policy after 
independence. To give an idea of the level of protection, in 1991 before the sweeping 
reforms were introduced, the average tariff was 117 percent and the import coverage 
ratio (a measure of non-tariff barriers) was 82 percent. The trade regime, which was 
characterized by high nominal tariffs and non-tariff barriers, was further complicated 
by a myriad of exemptions applicable to the basic duty rate. 
 The growth rate through the 1960s and 1970s hovered around 3-3.5 percent 
per annum, in what came to be known as the Hindu rate of growth. Kochhar et al. 
(2006) examine the implications of the development strategy followed since 
                                                 
3 Medium- or large-scale sectors are allowed to expand if they undertake to export a minimum of 75 





Independence. They show that India seems to have gone down a “strange pattern” of 
development. Compared to countries with similar size and development, circa 1981, 
manufacturing output and employment appeared to be above the norm in industries 
that are typically skill intensive or have large establishments. Also, the average 
establishment size was substantially smaller than in comparable countries. Further, 
the Indian manufacturing was more diversified both in terms of output and 
employment. They attribute this to “perverse” policy measures adopted since 
Independence. They go on to argue that the distortions in policy may have created 
potential sources of growth that allowed India to follow a different growth path as 
these distortions were removed. 
1.1.2 1980s: The Unnoticed Decade  
 Beginning in the early 1980s, there was some emergence of thinking about the 
need for a change in India’s economic policy. Many observers, for example, Rodrik 
and Subramanian (2005), among others, have noted the “pro-business” tilt in the 
development strategy and a shift away from the “license-permit-quota raj”. Among 
many reasons for this shift was the realization of the limitations of the development 
strategy followed hitherto. Also, the changing center-state relationship since 1977, 
coupled with increasing challenges to the Congress Party, have been put forward as 
possible causes for the shift.  
 Rodrik and Subramanian (2005) argue that the break from the Hindu rate of 
growth came not in the 1990s but in the 1980s and this was because of the pro-
business shift that has largely gone unnoticed. Sharma (2006) using firm level dataset 




significant rise in firm productivity. Further, she shows that there exists a strategic 
complementarity between trade and industrial polices—industries and firms that were 
de-licensed tend to have higher productivity after trade liberalization. 
 Some of the key aspects of the changes that took place in the 1980s were 
easing of the industrial and import licensing requirements, replacing quantitative 
restrictions with tariff barriers, simplifying the tariff barriers, and more importantly 
1980s was the first instance of a three-year trade policy. As Das (2003) notes there 
was a conscious effort to dismantle the import licensing regime via reductions in the 
number of products listed under banned/restricted category. 
 While the first steps towards reforms were taken in the 1980s, most of the 
observers who argue in favor of the changes starting in 1980s also note that the “big 
breakthrough” came in 1991. We discuss this in greater detail in the next section. 
1.1.3 The Summer of 1991: Crisis and Reforms  
 As the 1980s came to a close, India witnessed changes on both the political 
and the economic front. The general elections in 1989 saw the ouster of the Congress 
Party and the Janta Dal came into power. From the beginning the government was 
unstable and was dependent on the support from other parties. Fresh elections were 
announced in May 1991 and the Congress Party was voted back into power. Political 
uncertainties combined with the Gulf war in 1991, which sent India’s oil import bills 
soaring, pushed it to the brink of a crisis. 
 As the Congress took over the reins in Delhi in 1991, an economic crisis was 
looming large. Sample this, gross fiscal deficit as a percentage of GDP of the central 




gross fiscal deficit of the state and central governments as a percentage of GDP 
increased from 7.5 % to 9.5 % over this  period. Inflation was hovering around 15%, 
current account deficit increased from 1.5 % in 1980-81 to 3.1% in 1990-91, and the 
debt-service ratio was around 35% in 1990-91.4 Foreign exchange reserves nose-
dived to about US$ 1 billion, enough to cover only two weeks of imports, and India 
was on the verge of default on its international commitments. Gold was pledged with 
the Bank of England to maintain enough liquidity of foreign exchange reserves. 
Given the past history with England, this was considered a national humiliation and a 
sell out by the new government. 
 The Government of India requested a Stand-By-Arrangement from the IMF in 
August 1991 and entered into an IMF supported program. In addition to policies 
pertaining to reducing fiscal and current account deficit, a wide array of structural 
adjustment policies spanning the external, trade, industrial, financial and banking 
sectors were implemented. The extent and depth of the reforms introduced in 1991 
took everybody by surprise and were largely unanticipated (Aghion et al. (2006), 
Topalova (2005)). 
 The New Industrial Policy announced in July 1991 extended industrial 
deregulation, in both its coverage and depth, much beyond its initial phase in the 
1980s. These measures included abolition of industrial licensing for all but 18 
industries, eliminating public sector monopolies and allowing private investment in 
these industries (industries restricted for the public sector were reduced to 8 from 17), 
and relaxation of foreign direct investment rules. While there was an upper limit on 
                                                 





the extent of foreign participation, this varied from one industry to the other and has 
increased over the period.  
 Not only were the FDI rules relaxed, but doors were opened to portfolio 
investment as well. There was an immediate devaluation of the Rupee by 22% and a 
dual exchange rate system was introduced. Over time, Rupee was made fully 
convertible on the current account while there is still, at best, only partial 
convertibility on the capital account.  
 Sweeping trade liberalization measures were introduced. These included 
elimination of import licensing, progressive reduction of tariff and non-tariff barriers. 
We discuss these changes in greater detail in Section 1.3 and also compare them with 
the trade liberalization episodes in other developing countries. 
 The export- import policy (EXIM policy) of 1992–97 reaffirmed India’s 
commitment to promote free trade. All import licensing lists were eliminated and a 
“negative” list was established.5 Except consumer goods, almost all capital and 
intermediate goods could be freely imported subject to tariffs. By April 2002, all the 
remaining quantitative restrictions were removed. 
 Reforms were undertaken in the banking and the financial sectors as well. 
These included removal of control on capital issues, free entry for domestic and 
foreign private banks, and opening up of the insurance sector. Liberalization 
measures were taken in important services such as telecommunications. Some of the 
areas that remain largely untouched by reforms, even after 15 years, are the labor 
                                                 
5 Establishment of a “negative” list implied that all items except for those on the negative list could be 
imported without any import licenses and were not subject to any quantitative restrictions. Negative 





market, small-scale industries, and the agricultural sector. Despite all the initial and 
continued opposition to the changes, reforms have continued with every successive 
government and irrespective of where the political parties are positioned on the 
political spectrum. 
1.2 State-level Performance and Spatial Inequality in India 
 Dehejia (1993) summarizes the 1991 reforms by saying, “The most striking 
achievement of the reforms (has been) that commercial considerations, rather than 
government mandates are now the determinants in all investment decisions, including 
ownership, location, local content, technology fees, and royalty. The approval 
authority in the Directorate General of Technical Development in the Ministry of 
Industries has been eliminated. The Monopolies and Restrictive Practices Act has 
been amended…..Controls on the import of capital goods have been removed, and the 
many regulatory bodies (have been) dissolved or reconstructed….States now compete 
with each other to attract new investments (emphasis added).” As a result, location 
features are likely to become important in the investment decisions. 
 The role of the public sector has diminished substantially, both as an owner 
and a regulator of industrial location, leading to increased private sector dominance.6 
One of the objectives of the planned model followed since independence, and of the 
licensing system, was to ensure balanced regional development. However, with the 
diminished role of the public sector in the post-reform period and the private sector 
getting a free hand to make decisions on the location, there will be an increased 
                                                 





variation in industrial location. This is expected to contribute to the differences in the 
regional outcomes such as income, leading to higher spatial income inequality.  
 Ahluwalia (2000) and Kochhar et al. (2006) note that the devolution of 
political and economic powers to the states has prompted them to take a more active 
role in policy making, thus giving them the ability to formulate the right set of 
incentives to attract private investment.7 Therefore, it is important to study the 
differences in performance among states and to understand the reasons for better 
performance of some states vis-à-vis others. Kochhar et al. (2006) show that state 
level capabilities, policies, and institutions started to gain importance in the post-
reform period. With the center no longer enforcing inter-state equity, divergence in 
growth rates among the states has increased. 
 This divergent trend of the growth performance across states in India is well 
documented. Table 1.1 shows the average growth rates across states in the 1980s and 
1990s. The last row in Table 1.1 points towards an increased variation in the growth 
performance across states in the 1990s. Table 1.1 shows that three of the poorest 
states: Uttar Pradesh (undivided), Bihar (undivided) and Orissa have continually 
performed far below the national average.8 
 Further, we see from Figure 1.1 that the  inter-state inequality in India, as 
measured by the Gini-coefficient, was fairly stable up to the mid-1980s, began to 
                                                 
7 The transformation in the center-state relationship, however, started much earlier in 1977. 
 
8 State of Uttar Pradesh was divided into two parts, one is still called Uttar Pradesh and the other part is 
Uttaranchal. Similarly, two states formed out of the division of the state of Bihar are Jharkhand and 
Bihar. State of Chattisgarh was carved out of Madhya Pradesh. These divisions took place in 2001 and 
do not affect the current analysis, since the latest quinquennial household survey data available is for the 
year 1999-2000 (more on the survey data in Chapter 2). From hereon, Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, and 





increase in the late 1980s, and has continued to do so through the 1990s.9 Ahluwalia 
(2000) points out that the difference in the growth rates does not necessarily point 
towards a failure of the policy and stresses that given their sheer size and diversity, it 
is probably unrealistic to expect the states to grow at the same rate. Nonetheless, a 
continued low growth rate fo r the poorer states leads to increased inequality and a 
regional concentration of poverty. Given the size of these states (Uttar Pradesh, Bihar 
and Orissa) in terms of area (approximately 20 percent of total area), population (one 
third of the total population) and political representation (accounts for almost 20 
percent of the Members of Parliament), increased regional disparities can lead to a 
socially and a politically explosive situation.  
 The analysis in Chapter 2 looks at income disparities at the sub-state level. 
Before moving further, it is important to understand the concept of spatial inequality. 
It is a dimension of overall inequality where individuals are grouped according to 
their location and different spatial or geographical units are at different levels for 
some variables of interest, for example incomes, and each individual is assumed to 
receive the spatial unit’s average income.10  
 Using micro- level data, Table 1.2 shows regional wage inequality measures 
for the urban manufacturing sector, which is the sample under consideration in this 
                                                 
9 Inter-state inequality was calculated assuming that all individuals within a state have a gross income 
equal to the per capita state domestic product. Gini-coefficient then measures the inequality in the total 
population which arises solely because of inequality among states. 
 
10 This discussion is from Kanbur and Venables (2005). There are several possible characterizations of 
spatial inequality: (i) Unweighted variation in per capita income across spatial units, (ii) Population-
share weighted variation in per capita income across spatial units, (iii) Contribution of variation in per 
capita income across spatial units to income variation across all individuals. They note that it is the last 
two characterizations “that come closest to the instinct of mainstream economics to treat interpersonal 
inequality as being the fundamental object of interest.” From the perspective of this paper, it is the 
third characterization of spatial inequality that is of interest and if the ultimate objective is overall 





study.11 Wage inequality is calculated from the household survey data and using the 
Gini coefficient and the Generalized (Theil) Entropy measure is reported.12 Gini 
coefficient is calculated assuming that all the individuals in the urban manufacturing 
sector receive the average wage of the region. As shown in Table 1.2, regional 
inequality in urban manufacturing has increased over the twenty year period.13 
 Theil’s measure uses income shares as weights of the within-group component 
of the respective groups for decomposing total inequality into the within-region and 
between-region components. The between-group component of the decomposition 
tells us the portion of inequality attributable to the region-specific features when 
everyone in the region receives the average wage of the region. As shown in the last 
column of Table 1.2, spatial inequality has increased over the period under study and 
the share of between–region component (in total inequality) has gone up from 15 
percent to 24 percent.  
 Table 1.3 and Figure 1.2 provide a cross-country comparison of spatial 
inequality using the share of the between-component in the total inequality. It is 
evident that spatial inequality in India is fairly big when compared with other 
countries. Table 1.3 and Figure 1.2 show that the spatial inequality may not be a very 
high percentage of the total inequality (especially when compared with rural-urban 
component of inequality). However, as Kanbur and Venables (2005) note, its mere 
                                                 
11 Definition of region is provided in Section 2.5. Appendix A provides a map of India and Appendix B 
a list of regions included in the study. 
 
12 A detailed description of the data follows in Chapter 2. 
 
13 Both Gini coefficient and Theil’s measure show an upward spike in inequality in 1987. On further 
investigation it was found that there is a distinct upward spike across all states in average wages in this 
period. However, we continue to use the data for 1987 despite this anomaly because our results are 




existence becomes important when regional inequalities coincide with the divisions of 
socio-economic groups which can lead to discontentment, social tensions and extreme 
outcomes.  
 If there are differences in regional outcomes and there are no barriers to 
movement of labor within the country, one would expect people to migrate. Topalova 
(2005) points out (for India) that “the absence of mobility is striking”. 14 She further 
notes that the pattern of migration has also remained remarkably constant over time 
and there have been no visible spikes after the reforms in 1991. Using the national 
household survey data (same data as used in Chapter 2) for 1999-2000, she reports 
that in urban areas 13 percent of the people and only 3-4 percent in rural areas 
reported to have changed their district or sector (i.e. from rural to urban and vice-
versa) and this pattern has remained stable over time. Further, less than 0.5 percent of 
the population in the rural and 4 percent of the population in the urban areas migrated 
because of economic considerations.15 
 This is confirmed if we look at the statistics from the 2001 census, which is 
the latest round of enumeration in India. The relevant migration pattern from the 
perspective of the present study is migration for work or employment (economic 
considerations), movement across districts (within a state) or inter-state movement 
and limited to cases when the duration of migration is less than 10 years. These are 
reported in columns 3 and 4 of Panels A, B, and C in Table 1.4. The table indicates 
                                                 
14 Chiquiar (2004) and Amiti and Cameron (2004) note limited internal migration in Mexico and 
Indonesia, respectively. 
 
15 Migration figures are movement of people within the past 10 years across district boundaries or 





that migration is very low and points towards labor immobility. Some of the possible 
reasons for this could be: credit constraints, lack of information about opportunities in 
other regions and attachment to native place. One factor which is likely to be unique 
for India is the enormous linguistic and cultural diversity across states.  
 Limited internal migration and region-specific features accounting for a 
greater share of total income inequality combined with the diminished role of the 
central government in determining the location of new investments, makes it an 
interesting research question to understand the determinants of wage distributions 
across regions. We analyze the role of proximity to markets and suppliers in the 
regional wage structure and examine if they have a differential impact in the post-
reform period when there is less government intervention. This will shed light on 
better understand ing the differences in the regional performance in India, an issue that 
holds much relevance for policymaking in developing countries. We look at this in 
detail in the next chapter. 
1.2.1 Manufacturing Sector in India 
 The analysis in Chapter 2 focuses on the manufacturing sector. We do so for a 
variety of reasons. First, the theoretical predictions used in our analysis in Chapter 2 
are based on New Economic Geography (NEG) models. We remain close to the NEG 
framework and restrict our analysis to the footloose manufacturing sector only, where 
transportation costs combined with increasing returns to scale can serve as a 
centripetal force. Second, manufacturing was the most restricted sector through 
licensing and highly through trade barriers (Section 1.3 provides further details). 




including those related to location. Thus, location characteristics are likely to play a 
greater role in firm decisions leading to disparities in economic outcomes. Therefore 
it is important to understand how the manufacturing sector has responded to reforms, 
its implications for growth pattern and distribution of income.16  
 Third, India’s growth path has been very different from the traditional view 
proposed by Kuznets-Chenery which suggests an increase in the share of 
manufacturing with development, a commensurate decline in agriculture and little 
effect on services. In contrast to the East Asian and the South East Asian economies it 
is services rather than manufacturing that have led the growth in India. It is not 
necessary for all the countries to follow the traditional pattern of growth where 
manufacturing expands before services, and it might be the case that India has been 
able to carve out its own unique growth path. However this pattern is true for only 
some states and not all.  
 In this sub-section, we provide an overview of the manufacturing sector, its 
contribution to the whole economy in terms of employment and value added over the 
period under study and how does it compare with other countries.17 
 Table 1.5 presents the shares of output and employment in different sectors in 
India in 1981 and 2000, and compares it with a set of developing and developed 
countries. When compared with the East Asian economies and China, India’s share in 
manufacturing circa 1980, at 16 percent, seems to be low but the share of 
                                                 
16 Correlation between regional disparities (as measured by Gini coefficient calculated for each of the 
four rounds of household survey data) in the urban manufacturing sector and the urban services sector 
or the complement set of urban manufacturing sector (i.e. rural and urban services sector plus rural 
manufacturing) is positive. These correlations are 0.7 or higher. Thus, looking at the urban 
manufacturing sector gives us an idea of overall inequalities in incomes across regions. 
 




manufacturing varies with the level of development. For its level of development and 
size, in 1981, India had approximately the normal share of output and employment in 
manufacturing and below the norm in services. 
 Over the 20 period 1980-2000, the share of manufacturing in value added in 
India remained unchanged at roughly 16 percent and the share of employment in 
industry increased from 14 percent to 18 percent. It is the services sector that 
increased its share in valued added from 37 percent to 49 percent (mirroring the 
decline in agriculture) and from 19 percent to 22 percent in employment over the 
same period. Indian manufacturing sector showed signs over the period 1980-2000 of 
not keeping up with the average performance in other, similar, countries. The data 
suggests a pattern of a relative slowing in manufacturing growth, ironically when 
over this period the reforms were removing the shackles on manufacturing. 
 The aggregate developments are mirrored at the state level as well. Despite 
the liberalization policies, India is veering away from labor- intensive industries. 
Furthermore, there is no clear pattern of movement amongst states towards these 
industries and they seem to be moving into skill intensive services. However for the 
slow growing states, to catch up with fast growing, manufacturing might be the 
answer. With the Central government no longer enforcing balanced regional 
development through licensing, location features are important in influencing 
investment decisions.  
 In Chapter 2, we examine if regions closer to markets and suppliers have 
higher wages associated with them and if these location features become more 




transportation costs along with labor reforms will help lagging regions attract labor-
intensive manufacturing to utilize vast pools of underemployed low-cost labor. 
1.3 Trade Policy in India 
 One of the key ingredients of the reforms implemented in 1991 was the trade 
reforms. Academic and policy debates on the merits and demerits of trade 
liberalization have centered on the internal distributional consequences and on the 
question of how trade reforms affect labor markets. We investigate this further in 
Chapter 3. The rest of this section discusses the changes introduced in India’s trade 
policy as a part of the reforms implemented in 1991. 
 The international trade data on India that we use is from Das (2003). This 
database covers 72 three-digit manufacturing industries, according to the National 
Industrial Classification 1987 (NIC-1987), for the period 1980–81 to 1999–2000.18  
 Figure 1.3 shows the average tariff for the 72 manufacturing industries in the 
1980s and the 1990s. The average tariff in the manufacturing sector increased from 
86 percent in 1980–81 to 117 percent in 1990–91, and then declined to 39 percent in 
1999–2000. In comparison, the trade reforms in Brazil reduced the average tariff level 
in manufacturing from about 60 percent in 1987 to 15 percent in 1998; in Colombia, 
from 50 percent to 13 percent between 1984 and 1998. Between 1980 and 1990, the 
average tariffs in Mexico decreased from 23 percent to 13 percent. Thus, the 
percentage point reduction in average tariffs between 1990–91 and 1999–2000 was 
more drastic in India than in the Latin American countries (Figure 1.3).  
                                                 





 The level of protection also varied widely across industries. The standard 
deviation of the tariff rate was 23% in 1980–81. Imports in the two most protected 
sectors, textiles and cotton spinning, faced tariffs of 118 percent and 115 percent 
respectively. There was a considerable drop in the dispersion of tariff rates in the 
post-reform period. In 1999–2000, the standard deviation of the tariff rates dropped to 
6%. 
 The trade reforms also changed the structure of protection across industries. 
Figure 1.4 plots the tariffs in 1980–81 and 1999–2000 in various manufacturing 
industries. The tariffs declined in all the industries and the decline differed across 
industries. Table 1.6 shows the correlations of tariffs over five-year periods since 
1980–81. The pair-wise correlations range from 0.51 to 0.87. The correlation between 
tariffs in 1980-81 and 1999-00 is 0.51. The inter-temporal correlation of Indian tariffs 
is significantly lower than the correlation in U.S. tariffs. The correlation between U.S. 
tariffs in 1972 and 1988 is about 0.98. The low year-to-year correlation in the case of 
India is comparable to that in Brazil and Colombia (Pavcnik et al. (2004), Goldberg 
and Pavcnik (2005)). 
 In addition to tariffs, non-tariff barriers (NTBs) have also been reduced since 
1991. The measure of non-tariff barriers we use is the “import coverage ratio” which 
is defined as the share of imports subject to non-tariff barriers. Figure 1.5 shows the 
average import coverage ratio in manufacturing in the 1980s and 1990s. The average 





 Chapter 3 investigates the impact of these far-reaching reductions in Indian 
trade barriers, which came as a surprise, on its industry wage structure. We also 
examine the implications of the trade reforms for the wage inequality between skilled 




Chapter 2: Economic Geography, Spatial Inequality and 
Liberalization: Evidence from India 
2.1 Introduction 
 There is a great disparity in incomes across space, a fact that is well 
documented in the literature. This is true both across countries and within them. 
Figure 2.1 presents a cross-country comparison of the Gini coefficient of regional 
disparities. As shown, there are wide income disparities within countries and this is 
particularly true for emerging markets like China, Hungary, India, Mexico, Poland, 
and Turkey. A number of potential explanations like natural endowments such as 
climate and the disease environment19, institutions 20, and geographic location as 
emphasized in the new economic geography models have been put forward to explain 
these disparities across space.21 This chapter focuses on the role of geographic 
location in explaining disparities in income across space. 
 Location is important because of the barriers distance (in the form of 
transportation costs) creates to movements of final goods and inputs. Redding and 
Venables (2004), with the help of a simple example, show that transport costs can 
have first order effects on economic activity.22 Limão and Venables (2001) show that 
                                                 
19 See Diamond (1997), Gallup et al. (1998), Sachs (2001). 
 
20 See Acemoglu (2001), La Porta et al. (1998), Rodrik et al. (2004). 
 
21 See Krugman (1991), Krugman and Venables (1995), and Fujita et al. (1999) for a synthesis of 
theoretical research and Overman et al. (2003) for an overview of empirical work. 
 
22 The illustration used by Redding and Venables (2004) is as follows. Suppose that prices for 
intermediate goods and final output are set in world markets, and intermediates account for 50 percent 




doubling transportation costs can reduce trade flows by as much as 50 percent. Thus, 
distance can create significant frictions both between the firm and its markets, and 
also between input suppliers and the producers. Transport costs interact with 
increasing returns to scale to create demand and cost linkages resulting in 
agglomeration of economic activity, as has been shown in the New Economic 
Geography (NEG) models by Krugman (1991) and Krugman and Venables (1995), 
among others. The first question that we examine is the role of economic geography 
i.e., if greater proximity to markets and suppliers result in higher wages being 
associated with a region. 
 To investigate and answer this question, we look at spatial income inequalities 
in India. The following reasons make India an interesting case study. First, there exist 
wide disparities in incomes across states in India. Not only are these income 
disparities large but also among the highest as shown by the cross country 
comparison in Figure 2.1. Second, inter-state inequality has increased over the period 
1980-2000, which coincides with the time period under study for the case at hand. 
Figure 1.1 shows the evolution of inter-state inequality. The Gini coefficient  
measuring the inter-state inequality increased from 0.15 to 0.225 (an increase of 50 
percent) over the twenty year period. 
 Third, as discussed in Chapter 1, India witnessed a paradigm shift in policy 
making following the balance of payment crisis in 1991. There was a shift away from 
a ‘command and control’ economy towards a free market based economic system. 
The decision making moved from the public to the private sector. As Dehejia (1993) 
                                                                                                                                           
and intermediate goods which are borne by the producing country, then the value added falls by 30 





notes the “most striking achievement of reforms” has been that post-reforms it is 
commercial considerations that dictate the choice of location in investment decisions 
and not government mandates. We examine the additional question of whether 
proximity to the markets and suppliers become relatively more important in the post-
reform period.  
 The prospect of increased economic integration, deregulation, and 
liberalization by developing countries has led to widespread debates on the 
distributional implications, not only across countries, but also within national 
borders—which groups or individuals have benefited vis-à-vis the ones which have 
lost. It is, therefore, important to understand what factors contribute to uneven 
distribution of spoils from economic reforms. This issue is of relevance to fast 
growing emerging markets like China, Central and East European Countries 
(CEECs), Mexico and India, the last one being the focus of this analysis. 
 This essay is the first one to examine the role of economic geography in the 
regional wage structure and to probe if the re are additional effects of spatial features 
(i.e. proximity to markets and suppliers) on wages in the post-reform period in India.  
 The empirical methodology used is a two-step approach adapted from the 
labor literature. In the two step methodology, we first estimate Mincer-style wage 
regressions. This allows us to control for observable worker characteristics and 
compare similar workers across regions to look at the impact of proximity to markets 
and suppliers on wages. In the second step, we use estimated regional wage premia as 
a measure of wages to assess if regions with higher access to markets and suppliers 




economic geography on the average wages of a location and this can potent ially lead 
to biased estimates due to omitted worker characteristics. To the best of our  
knowledge, this is the first analysis to use this two-step “region-wage premium” 
methodology to examine the role of spatial characteristics in explaining the structure 
of regional wages. 
 We use nationally representative household survey data from India for the 
period 1980-2000 to investigate the question of whether location affects regional 
inequality in India and also examine whether that effect was exacerbated or 
ameliorated by the recent economic reforms. More specifically, we focus on the role 
of proximity to markets and suppliers in influencing the wages associated with a 
location. With de- licensing and deregulation of private manufacturing sector activity 
which were implemented as a part of the reforms, spatial features are likely to 
influence decision-making in the private sector. 
 We find that greater access to ports has a positive and a statistically significant 
effect on region wage premia i.e., regions closer to ports have higher wages 
associated with them. On the other hand, greater proximity to domestic markets and 
sources of supply is not associated with higher region wage premia. However, there is 
heterogeneity in their role over the time period under study. We find that in the post-
reform period the role of domestic market and supply access has become stronger and 
they have a positive and a statistically significant impact on wages associated with a 
region. However, we do not find any statistically significant increase in the 




 The results obtained in our analysis  are in contrast to those obtained in the 
existing studies (Hanson (1998) for Mexico, Crozet and Koenig-Soubeyran (2004) for 
Romania, Forster et al. (2005) for transition economies in CEECs, Lin (2005) for 
China). These papers conclude that regions closer to the bigger markets of the 
developed countries or closer to the ports have benefited during the post-reform 
period. One possible reason we see no change in the importance of ports could be that 
India’s growth path has been unique in that it has relied more on domestic markets 
than exports (Das (2006)) and external trade in India has not “taken off” in the same 
fashion as it has for China and Mexico. 
 These spatial features (i.e., proximity to ports, domestic markets and 
suppliers) contribute to the between-region component of the total income inequality. 
With no change in the role of ports and an increased importance of domestic market 
and supply access, our results in this chapter suggest that the share of the between-
region component in the total income inequality will be higher, resulting in an 
increase in spatial income inequality, in the post-reform period. 
 The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 presents a 
literature review and puts this study in the context of the existing literature, Section 
2.3 provides a discussion of the conceptual framework, Section 2.4 presents the 
empirical strategy, measurement of variables and discusses the estimation issues. 
Section 2.5 describes the data used in the analysis, Section 2.6 presents the results, 





2.2 Past Literature and Contributions 
  We look at the role of economic geography in explaining spatial inequalities 
in India and if the role of spatial features has changed in the post-reform period. This 
study relates to several strands of literature. The first strand of literature with which 
this essay can be linked to is related to the determinants of spatial inequality. Among 
these are the special volumes of Journal of Economic Geography (2005), Review of 
Development Economics (2005), and edited volume by Kanbur and Venables 
(2005).23 Davis and Weinstein (2005) investigate the importance of demand and cost 
linkages on regional productivity in Japan. They find that cost linkages between 
producers and suppliers of inputs, among other factors, has an important effect on 
productivity of a region.  
 Lin (2005) examines inter-regional wage inequality by looking at the effect of 
access to international markets and suppliers on wages in China. The results in her 
paper support the prediction from the NEG models that geography matters in 
determining the returns to labor. She finds that about 25 percent of the wage 
differences in coastal provinces and 15 percent of the wage differences in internal 
provinces can be attributed to differences in access to international markets and 
suppliers. Kanbur and Venables (2005) in their introduction to the volume note that 
“this (referring to the results from Lin (2005)) is further support for the proposition 
that greater openness can lead to greater spatial inequality in living standards, even 
when such opening up increases overall efficiency and growth, as it has done in 
China”.  
                                                 





 Kanbur and Zhang (2005) use time-series data from China to establish that 
regional inequality is mainly caused by three key policy variables—ratio of heavy 
industry to gross output, degree of decentralization, and degree of openness. Wan and 
Zhou (2005) using regression-based decomposition framework and household level 
data from rural China present a study of inequality accounting. They find that 
geography has been the dominating factor, but is becoming less important over time.  
 Lall and Chakravorty (2005) argue that spatial inequality in industrial location 
is a primary cause of spatial income inequality in India. They show that the local 
industrial diversity is one of the factors with significant and substantial cost-reducing 
effects.24 The authors show that the new private sector industrial investment in India 
is biased towards the existing industrial and coastal districts. They conclude “that 
structural reforms lead to increased spatial inequality in industrialization” and infer 
that this will lead to higher spatial inequality in income.  
 The analysis in this chapter differs from their study in two ways. First, we 
look directly at the effect of access to markets and sources of supply on the wages 
associated with a region. Second, they examine cross sectional firm level data to 
show that while spatial features guide private industrial investments, this is not the 
case for state industrial investments. Further, they argue that with the role of the state 
curtailed (both as an industrial owner and industrial location regulator), increased 
domination of private sector activity will lead to spatial concentration of economic 
activity post-structural reforms.  We use household survey data over the period 1983-
2000 to see if there is any heterogeneity in the role of spatial features in the post-
                                                 






reform period vis-à-vis the pre-reform period in explaining wages associated with a 
region. 
 The second set of studies with which this work is connected deals with the 
empirical testing of the NEG framework. Some of the papers include Hanson (2005), 
Redding and Venables (2004), Amiti and Cameron (2004). Overman et al. (2003) 
provides a very good overview of empirical work on NEG models. Hanson (2005) 
uses county level data for U.S. on wages, consumer purchasing power (total income 
used as proxy) and housing stock to examine if regional product market linkages 
contribute to spatial agglomeration in the framework as developed by Helpman 
(1998). He finds that the demand linkages are strong and are growing over time, 
though limited in geographical scope. Redding and Venables (2004), using cross-
country data show that access to markets and sources of supply are important in 
explaining the variation in per capita incomes across countries. Amiti and Cameron 
(2004) use firm level Indonesian data to estimate the agglomeration benefits that arise 
from vertical linkages between firms and show that demand and cost linkages are 
quantitatively important and highly localized.  
 A sub-strand of the literature dealing with empirical work on the NEG models 
investigates the importance of proximity to markets in the relocation of industrial 
activity within a country after the implementation of economic reforms. The analysis 
here is closely related to this sub-strand of literature. This set of papers deals mainly 
with Mexico and CEECs. These studies show that post-reforms the pull of the 
domestic market as measured by access to the industrial hub (usually the capital city)  




Hanson (1997) for Mexico and Crozet and Koenig-Soubeyran (2004) for Romania 
show that wage and employment patterns are consistent with the idea that market 
access matters for industrial location.  
 Forster et al. (2005), in a study of transition economies (Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland and Russia) conclude that capital city and well connected urban 
areas closer to the western markets in European Union have benefited more than the 
remote regions from economic growth. This is consistent with the findings from the 
study on Romania by Crozet and Koenig-Soubeyran (2004). Hanson (1998) examines 
the effect of trade reforms on regional employment in Mexico. He shows that 
transportation costs and cost-demand linkages influence regional employment. 
Further, post-trade reforms industries closer to the US border and closer to their 
markets and suppliers have seen relatively high employment growth. He concludes 
that trade-reforms have contributed to the decline of the manufacturing belt around 
Mexico City and formation of a new one along Northern Mexico. 
 On the contrary, we find that in the post-reform period, it is access to domestic 
markets and suppliers that have a positive effect on the region wage premia while 
there is no additional effect of being closer to the ports.25 We put forward potential 
explanations for this result which is in contrast with the existing results in the 
literature. 
 We contribute to the current literature in a variety of ways. This is the first 
study to examine the importance of proximity to markets and suppliers in explaining 
                                                 
25 India does not share a common border with any developed country and has little trade with its 






spatial inequalities at a sub-state level in India. Secondly, the two-step estimation 
methodology, adapted from the labor literature, presents a new approach to studying 
the determinants of spatial inequality using household survey data.26 Finally, the 
current analysis adds to the empirical work done on the NEG framework by 
extending it to India. 
2.3 Conceptual Framework 
 Starting with Krugman (1991) there is a growing literature that deals with the 
spatial distribution of economic activity and stresses the fact that distance and 
associated transport costs are important (Krugman and Venables (1995), Venables 
and Limão (2002)). This category of models is referred to as the New Economic 
Geography (NEG) models and is related to Harris’ (1954) market potential function. 
Fujita, Krugman and Venables (1999) show in a broad set of models how scale 
economies and transport costs interact to create demand and cost linkages resulting in 
agglomeration. NEG models predict that locations with better cost and demand 
linkages attract more industrial activity and have higher wages. In other words, some 
regions lag behind simply because of their remote locations.  
 The theoretical framework used here is based on the NEG model developed 
by Krugman and Venables (1995). This is presented in Appendix D.  
                                                 
26 Two other papers that come close to this methodology are Hanson (1997) and te Velde and 
Morrissey (2005). While Hanson (1997) uses the two stage procedure, he does not control for worker 
characteristics in the first stage. On the other hand, te Velde and Morrissey (2005) do not implement 
the second stage described above. They just control for the worker being located in the capital city of 
the country or not and interpret the coefficient on the dummy variable as the wage premium from 
being in the capital city. However, we go a step further and examine if greater access to markets and 





 The key assumptions of the model are, first, production is subject to 
increasing returns to scale at the firm level. Second, each firm produces a different 
form of the good i.e., goods are differentiated, or in other words, they are imperfect 
substitutes. Third, these differentiated goods enter the consumer’s utility function and 
the firm’s production function symmetrically. Next, the firms are completely 
symmetric and with free entry and exit there are sufficiently numerous firms to allow 
for monopolistic competition. Physical distance between consumers and firms leads 
to transportation costs. This introduces frictions and inhibits trade between regions 
bringing in the spatial dimension. Transport costs are assumed to be of the “iceberg” 
form. Finally, labor is assumed to be immobile between regions. 
 Maximizing the consumer’s and producer’s objective function gives the 
following wage equation (D.13 in the Appendix), 
 1( ) ( ) ( )s s s s sw v c A SA MA
ασ
β γ σ σ −= .     (2.3.1) 
 Where,α  is the share of the composite intermediate input in the total 
expenditure of the firm, β  is the share of labor, γ  is the share of the mobile primary 
factor of production and it is assumed that 1α β γ+ + = , σ  is the elasticity of 
substitution between any two varieties, and A is a constant. The left hand side of 
Equation 2.3.1 contains the wage (ws), the price of the mobile factor of production 
(vs), and  a measure of technological differences (cs). The terms on the right hand of 
Equation 2.3.1 are defined next. 
 SAs is the supplier access of region s and is defined as, 
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Supplier access is a transport cost (tsr) weighted measure of the supply capacity of all 
the regions. Supply capacity as measured by 1( )r r rs n p
σ−= is a product of the number 
of firms in other regions and their price competitiveness. Supplier access summarizes 




, in Equation 2.3.1 
gives the “black-hole” condition. If it is greater than one then no matter how high the 
transportation costs, few regions (which will be the “core”) will see agglomeration of 
economic activity. This will happen either if the share of intermediate inputs in costs 
(α ) is very high making the backward and forward linkages strong or if elasticity 
substitution between varieties (σ ) is small i.e. economies of scale are very large. 
 MAs is the market access of region s and is defined as, 
 1 1 1( ) ( )
R
s r r sr r sr
r r
MA E G t m tσ σ σ− − −
   
= =     
∑ ∑  .   (2.3.3) 
Analogous to supplier access, market access is a transport cost weighted measure of 
market capacity of all regions. Market capacity 1( )r r rm E G
σ −= in turn depends on the 
expenditure ( rE ) on manufactures (both by the consumers and the firms in the form 
of intermediate inputs) and the price index in region r ( 1rG
σ − ). Thus, market capacity 
of a region is the purchasing power of that region.  
 Thus, the wage in location s is a function of its market access (MA) and 
supply access (SA). Equation (2.3.1) can be expressed in logarithm form as follows, 
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 Further 0 1, , ,θ θ and 2θ  are all 
positive. In other words, regions with a greater proximity to markets and suppliers 
have higher wages associated with them.  Regions with a greater supply access benefit 
from being close to a larger supply of intermediate inputs due to savings on transport 
costs and from access to a greater variety of inputs. All other things equal, this 
implies lower cost of production and higher zero profit wages. This is the cost linkage 
or the supply access effect. Similarly, firms gain from being located in regions closer 
to the markets for their output on account of greater demand. This leads to increased 
revenues and higher zero profit wages. This is the demand linkage or the market 
access effect. 
 From the perspective of this analysis, access to markets and suppliers have 
two components markets and suppliers within the country and second, foreign 
markets and sources of supply. The error term in Equation 2.3.4, sη , includes the 
prices of mobile factors of production and the measure of technical efficiency (cs). 
We discuss estimation issues arising from this in the next section. 
2.4 Empirical Strategy, Measurement of Variables and Estimation 
Issues 
2.4.1 Empirical Strategy 
 The empirical strategy used is a two-step estimation approach widely used in 
the labor literature. We use regional wage premia, similar to the industry wage 




and suppliers have higher wages associated with them. Regional wage premia are 
defined as the portion of individual wages that accrue to the worker’s region 
affiliation after controlling for worker characteristics. Using the regional wage premia 
has the advantage that it helps to control for observable worker characteristics and 
compare similar workers across regions.  
 In the first stage, the log of individual worker (working in region r at time 
period t) i’s real weekly earnings (ln )irtw are regressed on a vector of worker 
characteristics ( )irtx  like education, age, gender, marital status, industry affiliation, 
occupation indicators, dummy variable for whether the worker is self employed and a 
vector of region dummies ( )irtr . Real earnings are used with weekly earnings 
deflated by the state level CPI. The first stage regressions are estimated separately for 
each time period in the sample. The estimating equation in the first stage is, 
 ln( )irt t irt t irt irtw x r uβ λ= + + .     (2.4.1.1) 
 The coefficient on the region dummy is the region wage premium ( )tλ  and it 
captures the part of the variation in wages that is explained by the worker’s location. 
The above specification gives us a set of region wage premia ( )tλ for each period. 
Also, the coefficients on individual characteristics ( )tβ vary over time. 
 Following Krueger and Summers (1988), the estimated wage premia are 
expressed as deviations from the employment weighted average wage premium. The 
normalized wage premium can be interpreted as the proportiona l difference in wages 
for a worker in a given region relative to the average worker in all regions with the 




 In the second stage, normalized regional wage premia from the first stage are 
pooled and then regressed on spatial characteristics. The second stage regression is 
estimated using weighted least squares. The weights used are the inverse of the 
standard errors of the normalized wage premium which are calculated using Haisken-
DeNew and Schmidt (1997) procedure.  
1 1ln( ) ln( ) *rkt rt r t k t k rtAccess Portλ κ τ δ φ ϕ φ ϕ ε
∧
= + + + + + + . (2.4.1.2) 
 Where, ( )rk tλ
∧
 is the normalized wage premium in region r in state k (at time 
period t), Accessr(t) is the domestic market access (DMA) and/or the domestic supply 
access (DSA) of region r (at time period t). We estimate different specifications 
where both are included in the same regression and where only one is included at a 
time. The core specifications are with either the domestic market or domestic supply 
access individually. The high degree of correlation between measures of market and 
supply access makes it difficult to identify their effects separately.  
 Portr is a measure of proximity of region r to foreign markets (FMA) or 
foreign suppliers (FSA). We do not include region fixed effects in any of the 
specifications because the fixed effects act like a composite measure of location-
specific features encompassing the time invariant measure of proximity to ports and 
institutions. However, state indicators (ϕk) are included in all specifications to control 
for variation in economic activity across states resulting from differences in policies, 
state- level institutions, and other potentially unobserved state level characteristics. 




other time variant but region invariant factors. The core specifications include 
interactions of the state and the time indicators.  
 The NEG model discussed in Section 2.3 show that regions with higher 
market access or supplier access have higher wages associated with them. Therefore, 
we expect the coefficient on Access (both DMA and DSA) and Port to be positive.  
 The time period under study, 1983-2000, witnessed sweeping changes in the 
economic landscape in India. With deregulation and liberalization, the role of the 
public sector declined both as the owner and as a regulator of private sector activity. 
Thus, with greater freedom to the private sector, location features are likely to gain in 
importance in the decisions of the private sector. The increased disparity in the 
location of new investments resulting from differences in spatial features can lead to 
greater inequality in outcomes between regions in the post-reform period. It is 
therefore interesting to examine if the role of spatial characteristics changed in the 
post reform period.  
 To examine for heterogeneity in the effect of spatial features on wage premia 
over time, we interact our variables of interest (i.e., Access and Port) with a post-
liberalization dummy. The specification estimated is, 
 1 2 1ln( ) ln( )* ln( )rkt rt rt t rAccess Access Postlib Portλ κ τ τ δ
∧
= + + + +
   2 ln( ) * *r t t k t k rtPort Postlibδ φ ϕ φ ϕ ε+ + + + . (2.4.1.3) 
Where Postlibt is the post- liberalization dummy which takes the value one in the post-
reform period (i.e., post-1991) and zero otherwise. Many researchers have dated the 
reform process to the mid-1980s instead of 1991. While there were some reforms in 




of reforms was far wider than those implemented in the mid-1980s. We therefore 
characterize post-1991 as the post reform period. A greater role for the location 
features in the post-reform period should be reflected in a positive coefficient on the 
interaction terms of both Access (both DMA and DSA) and Port with Postlibt. 
2.4.2 Measuring Domestic Market Access (DMA) and Foreign Market Access 
(FMA) 
 Market access (MA) is defined as the distance weighted measure of market 
capacity or proximity to the markets in which output is sold. Firms located close to 
regions with high market capacity benefit from greater demand and from low 
transportation costs making them more profitable. For the purposes of the present  
analysis, access to regions within the country and those outside the country are 
considered separately. The former is referred to as the domestic market access 
(DMA), and the latter is called the foreign market access (FMA). 
 Domestic market access of a region has two components. One is the demand 
from one’s own region, and the second is the demand from other regions but within 







−= .     (2.4.2.1) 
Here, rtmc  is the market capacity of region r at time period t. It is divided by the 
market capacity of all the regions combined, alltmc  (i.e., alltmc  is the sum of rtmc  
over all regions, r, at time period t) to get the share of market capacity of each region 




to make it comparable to otherDMA, which measures proximity to other regions 










= ∑ .     (2.4.2.2) 
Where, stmc  is the market capacity of other region s and rsd  is the greater-circle 
distance between regions r and s. We use two measures of domestic market access 
(DMA). First is the totalDMA which is the sum of ownDMA and otherDMA and 
second is the otherDMA. 
 Referring to the definition of MA in Equation 2.3.3, market capacity of a 
region is the total expenditure on manufactures (both by the consumers and by the 
firms in the form of intermediate inputs) of that region deflated by the appropriate 
price index. We use household expenditure of a region as a measure of the spending 
capacity of the consumers of that region. These are deflated by state level CPI. The 
spatial unit of analysis in this paper is a “region” (see section 2.5), which is a sub-
state unit. To the extent that there are variations in prices across regions within the 
states, use of state level CPI is a limitation of this study. 
 Due to limited data availability, we use state level data to find the expenditure 
on intermediate goods at the region level. The expenditure on intermediate inputs by 
each 3-digit manufacturing industry at the region level is calculated by multiplying 
the expenditure at the state level for that 3-digit level of manufacturing industry with 
the share of employment of a region (which is calculated for the respective rounds 
from the household survey data) in that state for the corresponding 3-digit level. The 




expenditures of all 3-digit level manufacturing industries in that region. We use the 
state GDP deflator to arrive at the real expenditure on intermediate inputs. This is 
then added to consumer demand to obtain the market capacity of each region. Since 
the data on the intermediate inputs for the region is not directly available, we do 
robustness checks by using only consumer expenditure as a measure of market 
capacity.  
 Distances between regions ( rsd ) are based on the great-circle distance 
formula.27 Internal distance ( )rrd  for each region is defined (following Leamer 
(1997) and Nitsch (2000)) as proportional to the square root of the area of the region, 
which gives (0.376)rr rd area= where arear is the area of region r.
28 
 Following Amiti and Cameron (2004), the measure of market access used is 
the expenditure in each region scaled by the total expenditure in the country as a 
                                                 
27 Great-circle distance formula calculates the minimum distance between any two points on the 
surface of a sphere along the path on the surface of a sphere (rather than going through the sphere). 
The shape of the earth is taken to be a sphere to calculate distance between two points on the earth. 
Latitude and longitude for each of the points between which the distance is to be calculated is required 
and the following formula is used:   
 
Distance (in kilometers)=6377*ARCCOS[(COS(90-Xi)*COS(90- Xj)) + SIN(90- Xi)*SIN (90- 
Xj)*COS (Yi – Yj )] 
 
Where Xi and Xj are the latitudes of points `i’ and `j’ respectively between which the distance is to be 
measured. Yi and Yj are the longitudes of points `i’ and `j’ respectively. Latitudes and longitudes are 
divided by 57.3 to convert them into radians and are used in radians in the above formula. Negative of 
latitude and longitude is taken if the location lies to the south of the equator or west of the prime 
meridian respectively. 
 
28 The discussion here is based on Head and Mayer (2000). Calculation of internal distance in the 
following way assumes that the economic geography of a region can be approximated with a disk in 
which all the production is concentrated in the center and consumers are randomly distributed 





rrd x f x dx= ∫ . Where, X denotes the radius of the disk, and f(x) is the density of the 
consumers at any given distance r to the center, 2( ) 2 /f x x X=  and /rrX area π= . Integrating 





whole. This is then divided by distance to give more weight to demand from closer 
regions than demand from regions that are further away. The aim here is not to get an 
estimate of structural parameters but to understand the importance of the proximity to 
the markets in influencing the spatial dis tribution of wages. As Equation 2.3.4 
suggests, proximity to larger markets (as measured by share of market capacity) 
should lead to higher wages.  
 Foreign market access is measured as the inverse of the distance, in 
kilometers, between the region and the closest port (Ports). Distance is calculated 
using the great-circle formula. There are limitations in using this measure of FMA. 
First, it does not vary over time and second, it does not include any measure of 
market capacity (see Equation 2.3.3 for definition of market access). As a result, 
Ports, might not capture the right access to foreign markets and lead to measurement 
errors.  
 We check our results with an alternative measure of FMA. Market capacity is 
a measure of the purchasing power. To construct an alternative measure of FMA, 
gross domestic product (measured in purchasing power parity terms) of various 
countries is used as a measure of market capacity. The alternative measure of FMA, 
FMA_gdp, is defined as the sum of the share of GDP of various countries in the world 
GDP (other than India) divided by the distance from each region in India to that 
country. In terms of Equation 2.4.2.2, mcallt is the total world GDP and mcst is the 




country s (drs) is calculated as the sum of the distance from that region to the closest 
port and from that port to the capital city of a country. 29 
2.4.3 Measuring Domestic Supply Access (DSA) and Foreign Supply Access 
(FSA) 
 Analogous to market access, we measure domestic supply access (DSA) and 
foreign supply access (FSA). Supply access is the distance-weighted measure of 
supply capacity or the proximity of firms in a region to its suppliers. Firms use 
intermediate inputs in production and locating close to regions with higher supplier 
capacity reduces not only the cost of intermediate inputs but also makes available to 
them a greater variety of inputs. This combined with lower transportation costs 
reduces the costs of production making the firms in the region more profitable. 
 Two measures of supply access used are totalDSA and otherDSA. TotalDSA is 
















= ∑      (2.4.3.2) 
Where, ( )rt stsc sc  is the supply capacity of region r (s), alltsc  is the sum of supply 
capacity of all regions at time period t.  
                                                 
29 Instead of including all the countries individually, we look at the following countries or country 
groups. This is a very exhaustive list and covers 85% of the world GDP. The city used for geo-location 
is in the brackets. The countries or country groups included are: Australia-New Zealand (Canberra),  
Bangladesh (Dhaka), Canada (Ottawa), China (Beijing), East Asia (Jakarta), European Union 
excluding CEECs (Brussels), Japan (Tokyo), Latin America and Caribbean (Brasilia), Middle East 
(Riyadh), Nepal (Kathmandu), North Africa (Cairo), Pakistan (Islamabad), Sri Lanka (Colombo), Sub-





 Supply capacity of a region is measured by the output produced in that region. 
We use the state level data to find the output produced in each region. The output 
produced by each 3-digit manufacturing industry at the region level is calculated by 
multiplying the output at the state level for that 3-digit level of manufacturing 
industry with the share of employment of a region (which is calculated for the 
respective rounds from the household survey data) in that state for the corresponding 
3-digit level. Total output produced in a region is then the sum of output  of all 3-digit 
level manufacturing industries in that region. We use the state GDP deflator to arrive 
at the output produced in real terms at the region level.  
 Foreign supply access is measured as inverse of the distance, in kilometers, 
between the region and the closest port (Ports). This measure of FSA is the same as 
that used for FMA and has the same limitations as discussed before. We use as 
alternative measure of FSA, this measure is FMA_gdp (defined in Section 2.4.2). 
Since market and supply access tend to be highly correlated and also because GDP of 
a country is a good indicator of the output produced, FMA_gdp is a good proxy for 
FSA. 
2.4.4 Estimation Issues 
 The location characteristics used to explain the regional structure of wages are 
proximity to markets and suppliers. However, it could be the case that the regions 
performing well due to better access to markets and suppliers might actually be doing 
so because of them sharing good institutions. This could lead to an omitted variable 




wages. To control for this potential omitted variable bias, we include a measure of 
institutional quality as another location feature. 
 However, institutions and proximity to markets are influenced not only by 
each other but also by income levels making them endogenous.30 If the measure of 
institutions used suffers from reverse causality, this will lead to biased estimates of 
the coefficient for institutions. Further, institutions should independently determine 
income and not simply be the consequence of greater access to markets and suppliers. 
Similarly, the coefficient on proximity to markets and suppliers should capture their 
direct effect on income. However, what it should not capture is the reverse feedback 
from income.  
 To deal with these issues what is needed is a source of exogenous variation for 
market access, supply access and institutional environment that is uncorrelated with 
the other determinants of income. Domestic market (supply) access for the current 
purpose is defined as the share of market (supply) capacity adjusted by distance. We 
take into account not only the region’s own market (supply) capacity but also that of 
other regions. The argument that there is reverse feedback from income to proximity 
is more likely to hold for own market (supply) access rather than access to other 
markets (suppliers). Therefore, the core results are based on the specifications which 
use otherDMA and otherDSA as measures of proximity. In addition, we perform 
robustness checks using otherDMA and otherDSA as instruments for totalDMA and 
totalDSA, respectively. 
                                                 
30 Rodrik et al. (2004) provide an excellent overview of potential problems that aris e when dealing 





 Acemoglu et al. (2001), working with the assumption that institutions change 
gradually over time, use settler mortality as an instrument for institutional quality to 
explain cross-country differences in income. In a similar vein, Banerjee-Iyer (2005) 
exploit colonial land revenue institutions set up during the British rule in India to 
show that differences in historical property rights leads to sustained differences in 
economic outcomes. Under the assumption that present day institutions are a result of 
historical developments and that institutions change only gradually over time, the 
Banerjee-Iyer measure of property right institutions is a good proxy for current day 
institutions. 
 Given that the measure of ins titutions used here is a historical measure, better 
institutional quality leading to higher income being the result of reverse causality 
from current income can be ruled out. Also, given the historic nature of the measure, 
institutional quality picking up any indirect effect of better access to markets and 
suppliers is minimized. 
 The measure of access to foreign regions used in the baseline specifications is 
the distance to the closest port. It could be the case that this definition of access to 
foreign regions is leading to some measurement error and is not capturing fully the 
access to foreign markets and suppliers. To address this problem, we use an 
alternative measure of access to foreign markets and suppliers, FMA_gdp, as defined 
in Section 2.4.2.2. The results are discussed in the section on robustness checks. 
 Referring to Equation 2.3.2 and the estimating equations in the second stage, 
as given by 2.4.1.2 and 2.4.1.3, the error term includes prices of mobile factors of 




are perfectly mobile, prices are included in the constant. To the extent that different 
states are not at the same distance from the technology frontier (Aghion et al. (2006)), 
these differences in technology across states are taken care of by the state indicators 
and their interactions with time indicators. However, to the extent that there might be 
differences in technology within regions in the same state these are not controlled for 
and this might bias the estimates. 
2.5 Data 
 The data used in this study draws from several sources. The individual level 
data comes from the Employment and Unemployment Schedule of the National 
Sample Survey Organization (NSSO), undertaken by the Government of India. The 
survey provides information on individual characteristics such as age, education, 
industry of employment, occupation, household size, marital status, monthly per 
capita expenditure, and location. We use the “thick” household surveys covering the 
period 1983-2000. More specifically, the household surveys used are: 38th round 
(1983), 43rd round (1987-88), 50th round (1993-94) and 55th round (1999-2000).31,  32 
NSS survey data is used to construct the regional wage premia as discussed in the 
previous section.  
 The analysis is restricted to individuals in the age group of 15 to 65 years who 
work in the urban manufacturing sector, are a part of the labor force and report 
                                                 
31 “Thick” surveys refer to the quinquennial surveys. NSSO conducts “thin” surveys every year. 
However, Employment and Unemployment survey is not carried out as a part of these “thin” surveys. 
Also, the number of households covered in the “thin” surveys is far less than those covered in the 
“thick” surveys. These surveys are repeated cross-sections. 
 






positive weekly earnings. We use the household survey data for 15 states and two 
union territories.33, 34 All the North Eastern states and all the union territories are 
excluded with the exception of the two Union Territories of Delhi and Chandigarh 
(Appendix A gives an outline of the map of India). Union Territory of Delhi is 
included on the grounds that it is the capital of India and also because it is one of the 
four big metropolises of India (the other three being Chennai, Kolkata, and Mumbai). 
Since the remaining three are included as a part of their respective regions, we 
include Delhi as well. Union Territory of Chandigarh is included because it serves as 
the capital to the two North Indian states of Haryana and Punjab. We therefore 
include all the major states and these are the ones commonly used for a cross-region 
analysis in India.35  
 In terms of the hierarchy of government, at the top is the Central (or federal) 
government followed by the State government and then the District administration 
(similar to county in the U.S.). Though using district level data would have been 
better as it allows for more dis-aggregation, we are restricted by the household survey 
                                                 
33 States included are Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Gujarat, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala, 
Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Orissa, Punjab, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh, and West 
Bengal. The two union territories included are Delhi and Chandigarh (comp lete list of union territories 
in provided in footnote 34). States excluded are all the North Eastern states (see footnote 35 for a 
detailed list), Goa, Jammu and Kashmir. Since the period under study is till 2000, creation of new 
states in 2001 does not affect the current work. 
 
34 Union Territories are regions governed by the central government. Union Territories are Andaman 
and Nicobar Islands, Chandigarh, Dadra and Nagar Haveli, Daman and Diu (Before 1990, this was 
Goa, Daman and Diu. Since Goa is left out it does not affect the current analysis), Delhi, 
Lakshadweep, and Pondicherry. 
 
35 We exclude Assam, which is included in some studies, to be consistent with the omission of all 
North Eastern states. Other North Eastern states are Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Manipur, Meghalaya, 





data which does not allow for the identification of the district for the urban sample in 
all the rounds. 
 The spatial unit of analysis used in this essay is a “region”. A region is a 
grouping of contiguous districts in any given state.36, 37 In terms of hierarchy, the 
spatial unit as defined here is below the state level and above the district level.38 
These regions are defined in the household sample survey conducted by the NSSO 
and hence, the combination of districts to form regions is not arbitrary. Since some of 
the data used here is from the household sample survey, choosing regions as the unit 
of analysis was a natural choice. Also, the composition of regions in Assam changed 
over the period under study and is therefore dropped from the analysis. This gives a 
sample of 58 regions in 15 states and 2 union territories (Appendix B provides a list 
of regions included in the study).  
 We use two data sources to calculate the domestic market access i.e. distance 
weighted expenditure measure. First, the household survey data gives the monthly 
consumer expenditure. Second, the expenditure on intermediate inputs comes from 
the Annual Survey of Industries (ASI, an annual survey by a unit of Government of 
India, also maintained by the Circon Data Center). Distance between regions (in 
                                                 
36 One exception to this grouping of contiguous districts is the state of Gujarat (one of India’s most 
industrialized states located on the west coast) where some districts have been split based on the 
location of dry areas and the distribution of the tribal population in the state. 
 
37 Though NSS data does not allow the district to be identified in the urban samples, it does provide 
separately the list of districts constituting each region. This  is helpful in creating regional measure of 
institutions as discussed later in this section. 
 
38 Note that there is no level of government at the region. This classification is purely for data 
collection purposes by the NSSO. If region were to have an administration then in terms of hierarchy it 





kilometers) is calculated using the “great-circle” formula, latitudes and longitudes for 
which are obtained from www.mapsofindia.com.  
 For the domestic supply access, data on output produced is obtained from the 
ASI. This data is available at the 3-digit level of National Industrial Classification 
(NIC) and at the state level. 39 ASI covers only the registered manufacturing sector. 
There is no corresponding annual survey for either the unregistered manufacturing or 
the small scale industry sector. ASI data for 1982, 1986, 1992, and 1998 are used 
corresponding to the 38th, 43rd, 50th, and 55th NSSO rounds, respectively.  
 Data on consumer price indices and state- level GDP deflators is from the 
Central Statistical Organization (CSO), Government of India. Two different price 
deflators are used. First, due to the non-availability of consumer price index (CPI) at 
the district or region level, we use state- level CPI to deflate wages and consumer 
expenditure. The precise CPI measure used is the CPI for industrial workers, reported 
for various centers all over India.40 We use simple average of CPI at various centers 
(within a state) to arrive at the state- level CPI. Another set of deflators, again at the 
state level, is the state GDP deflator. These are used for deflating intermediate inputs 
                                                 
39 ASI data for 1982 and 1986 uses NIC-1970 classification which is the same as the industry 
classification used in household survey data for 38th and 43rd rounds. For 1992 and 1998, the 
classification used in ASI and NSS data (50th and 55th rounds) is NIC-1998 respectively. Since at any 
point classification used in the two data sources is the same and also because I use total expenditure on 
intermediate inputs by all industries and the total value of output produced by all industries in a region, 
concordance between the two classifications is not required. 
 
40 “Centers” do not refer to any district or region. Information is collected from various locations 
(centers) all over the country to arrive at a national measure of CPI. Since these centers fall in different 
states, we average CPIs of various centers within a state to arrive at the state-level CPI. Further, not all 
regions (as defined for the purpose of this study) have a “center” where data on CPI is collected and 





expenditure and output.41 We do robustness checks by using common deflators i.e., 
by deflating the consumer expenditure, intermediate input and the output with CPI or 
alternatively, by deflating all of them with the state GDP deflator.  
 Access to foreign markets and suppliers is measured by the inverse of the 
great-circle distance between the regions and the ports42. The latitude and longitudes 
for the latter are obtained from the respective website of the ports. For FMA based on 
GDP of other countries, GDP (in PPP) is obtained from the World Development 
Indicators website. GDP data for 1982, 1986, 1992, and 1998 are used corresponding 
to the 38th, 43rd, 50th, and 55th NSSO rounds, respectively.  Geo- locations of various 
countries are taken from Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations 
Internationales’ (CEPII) website.43 Table 2.1 provides summary statistics for the 
various variables. 
 We use the historically determined Banerjee and Iyer (2005) measure of non-
landlord holdings in colonial India as the measure of institutions. This could be 
interpreted as a measure of the historical determinants of current institutions. The 
authors use the colonial land revenue system set up by the British in India and show 
that the differences in the historical property rights institutions lead to sustained 
differences in the economic outcomes. Areas where rights were given to the landlords 
have lower public investment in areas such as education and health as opposed to 
                                                 
41 For Chandigarh, the average of CPI of Haryana and Punjab is used while average of CPI of Haryana, 
Jammu and Kashmir, and Punjab is used for Himachal Pradesh. 
 
42 India’s mainland coastline stretches approximately 5600 kilometers and is dotted with ports. For the 
purposes of this paper, we only consider the 12 major ports. These ports are Chennai, Cochin, Kandla, 







areas where proprietary rights were given to the cultivators. They conjecture that 
these differences are a result of differences in the historical property rights leading to 
different policy choices.  
 The Banerjee-Iyer measure gives the proportion of land holdings in a district 
under the non- landlord revenue system. A value of one means the entire district was 
under the raiyatwari or cultivator-based revenue system. At the other extreme was the 
zamindari or landlord-based system, if the entire district was under this form of land 
tenure Banerjee-Iyer measure takes a value of zero. Values between zero and one 
mean that the whole district was not completely under either of the above two 
extreme systems or was under an alternative form of revenue system known as 
mahalwari which is village-based. In such cases, historical land records have been 
used to determine proportion of land under non- landlord holdings. 
 With information from NSS, which gives a list of districts falling in each 
region, we map the 1991 districts into various regions.44 Further, the data does not 
comprehensively cover all the districts and states. In case of missing data, we use 
information provided in Banerjee and Iyer (2005) which classify states into 
“landlord” versus “non- landlord” states.45 Based on this information, the missing 
districts are given a value of zero for landlord states and one for non- landlord states. 
Once the information is present for all the 1991 districts, the data is aggregated to the 
                                                 
44 Banerjee-Iyer data at the district level is in terms of districts in the year 1960. Their dataset provides 
a mapping of 1960 districts into 1991 districts. Using these 1991 districts, proportion of non-landlord 
area during colonial rule at the region level is calculated. 
 
45 This footnote comes from Banerjee-Iyer (2005, footnote 29): “Data on state-level land reforms 
comes from Besley and Burgess (2000). We classify Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Rajasthan, Uttar 
Pradesh, and West Bengal as “landlord” states, and Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Gujarat, Karnataka, 





region level based on the share of the area of each district in the total area of that 
particular region. 
2.6 Results and Discussion 
2.6.1 Estimation of Wage Premia 
 Following the two-step estimation methodology discussed in Section 2.4.1, 
the first step uses the log of real weekly earnings as the dependent variable for 
Mincer-style wage regressions. The right hand side variables include individual 
characteristics such as age, age squared, dummies for education, marital status, 
gender, head of the household, and indicators for occupation, two-digit manufacturing 
industry and regions. Table 2.2 presents the first stage regressions where Equation 
2.4.1.1 is estimated for each of the four rounds separately.46 The coefficients of the 
variables for individual characteristics such as age, education, marital status, gender 
are statistically significant and signed as expected. This also reposes our faith in the 
quality of the survey data. 
 The bottom part of the table shows the R-squared for the regressions with and 
without the region dummies. For example, in 1983, the R-squared for the regressions 
excluding region dummies is 0.49 i.e., the worker characteristics and industry 
indicators explain 49 percent of the variation in log weekly earnings. Adding the 
                                                 
46 NSS survey data has information on approximately 200,000-225,000 individuals in the urban 
sample. We provide here an example of how the sample size is reduced to less than 10,000 
observations. For the 50th round (1993-94), we have 208,390 potential data points in the urban sample. 
We keep only those who are a part of the labor force, which reduces the sample to 77,701 (loss of 
130,689 observations). Next, we keep individuals in the age group 15-65 reducing the sample further 
to 73,167. Of 73,167 individuals, only 37,803 report positive earnings. Further, restricting the sample 
to manufacturing sector results in a loss of 29,229 observations. This leaves us with 8,574 data points. 
Of these 342 are lost since we use data on 17 states (see footnote 33) only leaving us with 8232 





region dummies increases the R-squared to 0.57. In other words, 8 percent of the total 
variation in log weekly earnings is accounted for by the region indicators. In general, 
the region indicators explain about 4 to 8 percent of the variation in log weekly 
earnings. Region indicators are jointly statistically significant at 1 percent level with 
many of the wage premia being individually statistically significant as well.  To the 
best of our understanding, there is no other paper which takes the region wage premia 
approach and hence, there is no benchmark to compare with. However, 4 to 8 percent 
explained by region indicators is comparable with what is explained by industry 
indicators in India, as shown in Kumar and Mishra (2007, also, Chapter 3 of this 
Dissertation).  
 Table 2.3 provides summary statistics on the estimated region wage premia. 
These region wage premia are the normalized wage premia i.e., expressed as 
deviations from the employment weighted average wage premium. Appendix E 
provides the normalized region wage premia and their standard errors for all the four 
rounds.  
 There is considerable dispersion in the wage premia across industries and 
standard deviations range from 0.25 to 0.29 for the different years as shown in Panel 
A of Table 2.3. Estimates show that in 1999-2000 (Round 55), regions with the three 
highest wage premia are 51 (Bihar-Southern), 143 (Maharashtra-Inland Northern), 
and 73 (Gujarat-Plains Southern); regions with the lowest premia are 53 (Bihar-
Central), 23 (Andhra Pradesh-South Western), 262 (West Bengal-Eastern Plains).  




observable characteristics switching from, for example, region 53 to region 73 would 
see a 58% (0.342-(-0.239)) increase in earnings. 
 However, the structure of region wage premia has changed over time. Panel B 
of Table 2.3 presents year to year correlations in the region wage premia. The 
correlation between the wage premia in 1983 and 1999-2000 is 0.45 and 0.40 for the 
wage premia in 1983 and 1993-94.  
 Figure 2.2 provides average region wage premia by zones.47 We see that the 
North Zone has a consistently high wage premia as opposed to the rest of the zones. 
Also, regions in Western India have a positive wage premia except for a small decline 
in 1993-94 (Round 50). Regions in Eastern and Central India have a negative wage 
premia during the entire twenty year period. These zones include the slow growing 
and the lagging states. However, negative average premia in Southern India for all the 
four rounds is somewhat surprising. Also, these wage premia are lower than the 
average wage premia in Central India. However, this trend might be on the reverse, 
for the latest period (1999-00, Round 55) wage premia in Southern India is higher 
than that in Central India. 
 Further, Figure 2.3 shows that there is a negative correlation between initial 
wage premia in 1983 and change in wage premia over the period 1983-2000. This is 
also consistent with falling year to year correlations in region wage premia shown in 
Table 2.3 (Panel B). With significant economic reforms during the sample period, 
                                                 
47 North Zone includes regions in the states of Himachal Pradesh, Haryana, Chandigarh, Punjab and 
Delhi. West Zone includes Rajasthan, Gujarat and Maharashtra. West Bengal, Bihar and Orissa are in 
the East Zone. Madhya Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh form the Central Zone. South Zones includes the 
states of Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala, and Tamil Nadu. For a list of regions in each state, please 




economic geography and its changing role could potentially constitute an explanation 
for the changing structure of the region wage premia. 
2.6.2 Location Characteristics and Wage Premia: Second Stage Regressions  
 In the second stage, the estimated region wage premia (expressed as 
deviations from the employment weighted average wage premium), which represents 
the portion of individual wages that accrue to the worker’s location affiliation, are 
regressed on spatial features such as access to domestic markets/suppliers, foreign 
markets/suppliers, and institutions. All the second stage regressions are estimated 
using weighted least squares with weights being the inverse of the standard errors of 
the normalized wage premia which are calculated using the procedure from Haisken-
DeNew and Schimdt (1997). 
 Results from estimating Equation 2.4.1.2 are presented in Table 2.4. Panel A 
shows the results for the case where the measure of Access used is totalDMA (i.e., 
including both ownDMA and otherDMA), and Panel B presents the estimation results 
where Access is defined as totalDSA (= ownDSA + otherDSA). All the regressions 
include state and year indicators. Robust standard errors clustered at the region level 
are reported. In all the regressions, state indicators are jointly significant and the p-
values from the test of significance are reported for all the specifications.48 The 
coefficient estimates obtained here reflect heterogeneity in region wage premia 
resulting from spatial characteristics.  
 In column 1 of Panels A and B in Table 2.4, state indicators are included to 
control for differences in economic activity across states resulting from different 
                                                 
48 In all specifications, which include state indicators interacted with time indicators, p-values for the 




policies, state- level institutions, and other potentially unobserved state level 
characteristics. In addition, time indicators are also included to control for 
macroeconomic shocks and any other time varying but region invariant effects. In 
both the cases, coefficients on totalDMA (totalDSA) and Port are statistically 
significant and positive implying that greater access to markets and suppliers have a 
positive effect on wages associated with a region. However, with our definition of 
Port (distance to the closest port) we are unable to say whether this is foreign market 
or foreign supply access. 
 Estimation results reported in column 2 include institutions to control for 
omitted variable bias that could arise due to some regions having good access to each 
other and being prosperous not because of their proximity to markets but because of 
them having good institutions. In column 2 in both the Panels of Table 2.4, the 
coefficients of totalDMA (totalDSA) and Port continue to be positive and statistically 
significant. In addition, the coefficient of institutions is positive (as is expected 
because better institutions foster a better climate for growth, attract greater investment 
and result in higher wages being associated with a region).  
 In columns 3 and 4 (both Panels in Table 2.4), specifications from columns 1 
and 2, respectively, are generalized further to include state varying time effects. The 
coefficients on totalDMA (totalDSA), Port and institutions continue to be positive and  
statistically significant.  
 However, it might be the case that the own-region component of totalDMA  




Panels A and B of Table 2.5 which reports the results for otherDMA and otherDSA 
respectively.  
 If we look at column 1 of Panel A (B), otherDMA (otherDSA) is no longer 
significant but Port continues to be statistically significant and signed as expected. 
OtherDMA and otherDSA continue to be insignificant in column 2 in both the Panels 
after including institutions. In columns 3 and 4 of Panels A and B (Table 2.5), 
estimation results after including interaction of state indicators with year indicators 
are reported. Domestic market and supply access continue to be statistically 
insignificant. Port measures the access to foreign markets (suppliers) and it continues 
to be statistically significant in both cases.  
 Thus, the proximity to internal markets as measured by totalDMA (or 
totalDSA) is significant but not when the own-region component is excluded and 
otherDMA (otherDSA) is used.  
 Referring to Equation 2.3.4 the reduced form specification includes both 
access to domestic markets and suppliers. Table 2.6 presents the results with both 
domestic market and supply access included in the same specification. However, due 
to the high correlation, 0.8, between the measures of market and supply access, it is 
difficult to identify their effects individually.49 This can be seen from Panel A in 
                                                 
49 Redding and Venables (2004) in their analysis of the importance of market and supply access in 
explaining cross-country differences in per capita income, find that the high degree of correlation 
between market access and supplier access make it difficult to separately identify their individual 
effects. Similarly, Davis and Weinstein (2005) looking at the role of linkages in explaining cross-
regional variation in productivity in Japan, find that the high-correlation between the demand and cost 
linkages measures makes it difficult to identify the effects of the two separately. They find that as a 
result of multicollinearity (correlation is 0.95), using both linkage terms in the same estimating 
equation does increase the standard errors (We find this to be true for results in Table 2.6 compared 




Table 2.6, where totalDMA is no longer significant and only totalDSA is statistically 
significant. Similar to the results in Table 2.5 using only the “other”-component 
leaves measures of market and supply access statistically insignificant as shown in 
Panel B of Table 2.6. However, coefficients on Ports and institutions are statistically 
significant and signed as expected.  
 Thus, because of the simultaneity bias arising from the ownDMA and ownDSA 
component of totalDMA and totalDSA, we use otherDMA and otherDSA as the 
preferred measures of domestic market and supply access respectively. Further, the 
preferred specification is the one with either the domestic market access or supply 
access but not both at the same time. In the next section, we instrument totalDMA 
(totalDSA) with otherDMA (otherDSA). 
 The period under study, 1980-2000, was a period of changes in the economic 
and political landscape of India and the year 1991 saw a sea-change in the economic 
policy-making in India. Table 2.7 examines whether the impact of spatial features on 
wages changes in the post-reform period. Both the Panels A and B use the preferred 
measure of proximity to markets and suppliers i.e., otherDMA and otherDSA 
respectively, and Equation 2.4.1.3 is estimated. The preferred measures of market and 
supply access are interacted with a dummy variable, Postlib, which equals one if year 
of household survey is after 1991 and zero otherwise. As a result, two of the time 
periods 1983 (NSS round 38) and 1987-88 (NSS round 43) are characterized as pre-
                                                                                                                                           
 Amiti and Cameron (2004), on the other hand, using disaggregated firm level data from 
Indonesia find that correlation between market access and supply access is 0.23 allowing them to 





reforms whereas 1993-1994 (NSS round 50) and 1999-2000 (NSS round 55) are 
characterized as falling in the post-reform period.   
 As before, compared with Panels A and B of Table 2.5, otherDMA (Panel A 
of Table 2.7) and otherDSA (Panel B of Table 2.7) are insignificant in all the 
columns. In all the columns, in the both Panels A and B, Ports and institut ional 
quality are statistically significant. A greater proximity to ports and better institutional 
quality leads to higher wages being associated with that region.  
 OtherDMA*Postlib (otherDSA*Postlib) show if there is any heterogeneity in 
the role of domestic market access and supply access variables over time. In columns 
1 and 2 in both the Panels of Table 2.7, the interactions of domestic market and 
supply with Postlib are insignificant. Columns 3 and 4 (in both the Panels), generalize 
the specification used in columns 1 and 2 respectively, and interactions of state and 
time indicators are included.  
 Looking at columns 3 and 4 in Panel A of Table 2.7, otherDMA*Postlib is 
positive (as expected) and statistically significant (at 1 percent level of significance) 
implying that there is a differential impact in the post- liberalization period of greater 
proximity to domestic markets. Similarly in Panel B of Table 2.7, the coefficient of 
otherDSA*Postlib is positive and statistically significant at the 1 percent level in 
columns 3 and 4. In other words, in the post-1991 period regions with greater access 
to domestic markets and suppliers have higher wages associated with them, whereas 
this was not the case in the pre-1991 period. 
 The statistical insignificance of the interaction term (otherDMA*Postlib or 




due to the low power of the test resulting from the restrictions  imposed which limit 
state level effects to be time- invariant. On other hand, columns 3 and 4 do not impose 
any such restriction and include time variant state level effects allowing for a more 
general specification. The more general estimations in column 3 and column 4 (in 
both Panels A and B, Table 2.7) are the preferred specifications.50 
 In columns 5 and 6 of Panels A and B (Table 2.7), we examine if there is any 
heterogeneity in the impact of access to ports and institutions. Only the specification 
including interactions of state and time indicators are reported. The interaction terms, 
otherDMA*Postlib (in Table 2.7, Panel A, columns 5 and 6) and otherDSA*Postlib 
(in Table 2.7, Panel B, column 5 and 6) continue to be statistically significant and 
positive. The coefficient on Ports*Postlib, though positive as expected, is not 
statistically significant at conventional levels and we do find proximity to foreign 
markets and suppliers becoming any more important post-reforms. Also, we do not 
find any additiona l effect of institutional quality post-liberalization as shown in 
column 6 of both the Panels by the coefficient of institutional quality interacted with 
Postlib. 
 Table 2.7 (Panel C) presents the results for the case where otherDMA, 
otherDSA and their interactions are included in the same specification. As before, 
(Table 2.6, Panel B) otherDMA and  otherDSA are statistically insignificant when 
included in the same specification. Also, in this case there is no heterogeneity in the 
                                                 
50 All tables examining the heterogeneity of the proximity terms include p-values from the test for the 
total effect of each proximity term in the post-liberalization period. While the total effect of domestic 
market access terms is positive post-reforms, there is only weak evidence of the total effect being 
positive in the case of the domestic supply access. However, what we are interested in is the interaction 
term so as to examine if there is any structural break in the relationship between proximity and wages 




role of either otherDMA or otherDSA in the post-reform period. In all the columns, 
Ports and institutional quality are positive and statistically significant, but no 
additional effect (i.e. interaction with Postlib is statistically insignificant) in the post 
reform period as shown in the columns 3 and 4. 
2.6.3 Robustness Checks 
 Our results show that proximity to ports is associated with higher region wage 
premia. On the other hand, greater proximity to domestic markets and sources of 
supply are not associated with higher region wage premia before liberalization. 
Interestingly, however, there is heterogeneity in their role over the time period under 
study. We find that post-reforms domestic market and supply access have a positive 
and statistically significant impact on wages associated with a region. The effect of 
greater access to ports and better institutional quality does not appear to have become 
any stronger post-reforms. In this section, we perform several robustness checks on 
our results. 
 First, we use an alternative measure of access to foreign markets and 
suppliers, FMA_gdp, as defined in Section 2.4.2.2. This measure takes into 
consideration the market (and supply) capacity of foreign regions rather than just 
using the inverse of the distance to the closest port. Since comparable measures of 
market and supply access tend to be highly correlated, we use FMA_gdp as a measure 
of access to foreign suppliers as well.  
 Results using this alternative measure of foreign market access are reported in 
Table 2.8 (Panels A and B). From both the Panels of Table 2.8, we see that our 




is higher than those on Ports in comparable specifications in Table 2.7. This indicates 
that there could be a measurement error in using distance to the closest port as a 
measure of proximity to foreign locations. 
 It could be the case that using the distance to the closet port (Ports) is picking 
up the effect of regions associated with the big ports rendering otherDMA and 
otherDSA insignificant. We check for this, first, by using FMA_gdp as the alternative 
measure for access to foreign regions. This measure uses the distance of a region to a 
foreign country and not distance to the closest port as a measure of access to foreign 
markets. This should mitigate concerns that proximity to ports is capturing access to 
domestic markets. Results using FMA_gdp, reported in Table 2.8, show that 
otherDMA and otherDSA continue to be insignificant. Second, we drop the proximity 
to foreign markets and suppliers altogether and use only otherDMA and otherDSA. 
This does not lead to the coefficients on these terms becoming statistically significant. 
It is unlikely that Ports is picking up the effect of access to regions with big ports.  
 Our results show that post-reforms, access to domestic markets and suppliers 
that are significant and ports are not any more important than they were pre-reforms. 
Opposite to the previous paragraph, it could be the case that proximity to domestic 
markets and suppliers in the post reform period is in fact proximity to ports. 
 To answer this, we re-define otherDMA and otherDSA to leave out all the 
regions associated with the big ports in the calculation of market and supply access. 
We call them otherDMA_minusports and otherDSA_minusports, respectively. Table 
2.9 (Panels A and B) shows the results with Ports as the measure of FMA and FSA. 




effect in the post reform period and there is no additional effect from greater access to 
ports. As an additional check (results not reported), we use FMA_gdp instead of Ports 
as a measure of access to foreign markets and suppliers with otherDMA_minusports 
and otherDSA_minusports. We find that our results are unchanged. 
 We have used otherDMA and otherDSA as the preferred measures of domestic 
market access and supply access due to the simultaneity bias arising out of the 
ownDMA and ownDSA components of totalDMA and totalDSA. Here, we instrument  
the latter with otherDMA and otherDSA.51 Results from the second stage of the 
instrumental variable regression are reported in Table 2.10.52 The results obtained in 
the respective panels of Table 2.7 continue to hold. 
 The measure of market capacity used to construct domestic market access 
includes both consumer expenditure and intermediate inputs. But due to the non-
availability of intermediate inputs at the region level, expenditure on intermediate 
inputs has been calculated from the state level data. We modify the definition of 
market capacity to include only consumer expenditure. We find that restricting the 
definition of market capacity to include only the consumer expenditure does not alter 
our results. OtherDCX is insignificant in Table 2.11, and institutions and access to 
ports are significant with the expected sign as in Panel A of Table 2.7. Like in Panel 
A of Table 2.7, otherDCX continues to have a statistically significant and a positive  
                                                 
51 Both totalDMA and its interaction with Postlib are instrumented. The instruments used are 
otherDMA and its interaction with Postlib. 
 
52 The first-stage regression results for the IV estimation are not reported here. For the IV estimation 
results reported in columns 1-4 of Table 2.10 (both the panels), the R-squared from the various first 






impact post- liberalization. There is no additional effect in the post-reform period from 
greater proximity to ports and better institutional quality. 
 We expand the sample to include the rural manufacturing sector as well and 
the results shown in Panels A and B of Table 2.12 confirm that the choice of urban 
manufacturing sector does not seem to be driving the results.53 As in Table 2.7, 
otherDMA and otherDSA have a statistically significant and a positive impact in the 
post-liberalization period. However, the magnitude of the coefficients on Ports is 
reduced, but they continue to be statistically significant, though at lower levels of 
significance. Also, the coefficients on institutional quality are higher than those 
reported in Panels A and B of Table 2.7. There is no heterogeneity in the role of both 
Ports and institutions over time. 
 The state level CPI has been used to deflate the consumer expenditure and the 
state GDP deflators are used for intermediate inputs and output. Instead of using 
different deflators for consumer expenditure and intermediate inputs, we use a 
common deflator for both. We check our results with both CPI and state GDP 
deflators. Results are shown in Panel A of Table 2.13 and the result are qualitatively 
similar compared to the corresponding specifications in Panel A of Table 2.7. 
Similarly, in the case of otherDSA (results reported in Table 2.13, Panel B) calculated 
using CPI as the deflator for output, instead of GDP deflators, the results from Panel 
B of Table 2.7 continue to hold. 
                                                 
53 First-stage regressions, from estimating Equation 2.4.1.1, for each of the four rounds of the 






 We find that a greater access to the ports has a positive and a statistically 
significant effect on the region wage premia i.e., regions closer to the ports have 
higher wages associated with them. On the other hand, greater proximity to domestic 
markets and sources of supply are not associated with higher region wage premia 
before liberalization. However, there is heterogeneity in their role over the time 
period under study. We find that post-reforms the role of domestic market and supply 
access has become stronger and they have a positive and statistically significant 
impact on wages associated with a region. The effect of greater access to ports and 
better institutional quality does not appear to have become any stronger post-reforms.  
 Industrial and trade policy pursued after independence heavily restricted 
private sector activity and licensing requirements dictated, among other things, the 
investment location. Once private sector activity is deregulated and de-licensed, 
location-specific features are likely to play a more important role in the decisions of 
economic agents. As a result, post-reforms regions with greater market and supply 
access will attract more investment (a higher share of which is increasingly coming 
from the private sector). This will contribute to disparities in location of economic 
activity and outcomes such as income (as conjectured by Lall and Chakravorty 
(2005)). We find that post reforms regions with better access to domestic markets and 
suppliers have higher wage premia.  
 On the other hand, access to foreign markets and suppliers as measured by 
proximity to ports (Ports) are statistically significant and regions closer to ports have 




statistically significant evidence of the ports being any more important. This is in 
contrast to the result found in the literature for the case of CEECs (Crozet and 
Koenig-Soubeyran (2004) for Romania, Forster et al. (2005)) for transition economies 
in CEECs) and Mexico (Hanson (1998)) where after reforms access to developed 
country markets became more important in the regional structure of wages and 
employment.   
 There could be several potential explanations for this result. First, this could 
be due to the fact that the measure of access to foreign markets and suppliers is time 
invariant and one expects little to change over time as distance remains constant. 
However, there is no change in this result when we use FMA_gdp (which is time 
variant) as a measure of proximity to foreign markets and suppliers. Hanson (1997) 
also finds no evidence of a differential impact of distance between the U.S. border 
and Mexican states on regional relative wages in the post-reform period.  
 Another potential explanation for no additional impact of proximity to ports 
could be that the external trade has not “taken off” the way it has for China and 
Mexico. To give an idea, trade in goods as a percentage of its GDP increased from 18 
percent to 44 percent in China, from 21 percent to 60 percent in Mexico over the 
period 1980-2000, whereas in the case of India it increased from 13 percent to 20 
percent over the same period.54 Das (2006) notes India’s pattern of growth has been 
unique. One of the differentiating patterns has been that it has relied more on 
domestic markets than exports. This could explain why post-reforms domestic 
                                                 





markets and suppliers have a positive effect on wage premia but not proximity to 
ports. 
 The manufacturing sector witnessed extensive reforms in the form of both 
domestic deregulation and trade reforms through reduction of tariff and non-tariff 
barriers. With no change in the role of ports and a stronger role of proximity to 
domestic markets (and suppliers) in the post-reform period, our results suggest that 
deregulation of manufacturing sector seems to have played a greater role in firm 
decisions rather than increased proximity to world markets. However, without better 
measures of de- licensing and trade liberalization it is not possible to test this directly. 
 Finally, better institutional quality leads to better provision of public goods, 
fosters a better investment climate and therefore, regions with stronger institutions 
have higher wages associated with them. However, there is no evidence that 
institutions have gained in importance in the post-reform period. One explanation for 
this result could be that the measure of institutions being used is a historical measure 
and its ideal use is as an instrument and not as a direct measure of current institutions 
as noted by Rodrik et al. (2004). They argue that, “while colonial history does not 
provide a satisfactory account of income differences in the world, it can still provide a 
valid instrument.” Due to the lack of any direct measure of current level institutions at 
the region level, we use the Banerjee-Iyer measure directly as a measure of 
institutions and to that extent is a limitation of this study. However, post-
independence districts have been brought under the control of state administration 
and it is the state level institutions that are important. To this end state level indicators 




 Additionally, there could be concerns that agglomeration of industrial activity 
resulted from the location bias in government policy. There are many reasons to 
believe that this is not the case. First, unlike Mexico where Mexico City benefited 
from subsidies and government favors leading to concentration of economic activity 
in and around the capital (Hanson (1997)), in India, the Central government 
controlled the location of production as a part of the licensing requirements to 
mitigate regional inequality.  
 Second, in the post-1991 period the Central government, with no control over 
the location of new investment, could (and in fact does) provide incentive  packages 
favoring some locations over the others. However, these incentives are more likely to 
be given to regions lagging behind (for example, special development packages for 
North Eastern states by the Central government) rather than those attracting 
investment on their own. So if this was indeed the case, proximity to markets and 
suppliers should have either negative or statistically insignificant effect on wages 
associated with the region. On the contrary, we find post-reforms access to domestic 
markets and suppliers have a positive effect on wages associated with a region. 
 Third, as mentioned above, post-1991 states competed with each other to 
attract private investment and State governments offered incentives to locate 
investment in their respective states. To that extent, state indicators interacted with 
time indicators should account for differences in the state policies.  
2.6.5 Quantification and Implications for Spatial Inequality 
 In this sub-section, we present implications of our results for spatial 




improvement in proximity to markets and suppliers in the post-reform period. In 
doing so, we use the estimates reported in column 6 of Table 2.7 (Panels A and B). 
Calculations are shown in Table 2.14. 
 Results from column 6 in Panel A of Table 2.7 suggest that post-reforms an 
increase in the domestic market access from median to the 75th percentile increases 
wage premia by 44%. This increase is evaluated at the wage premia of the region 
corresponding to the median domestic market access55.  
 Assuming this translates into an increase in the wages of the entire region, we 
find that the Gini Coefficient increases from 0.266 to 0.268 for the 55th round (Table 
1.2). This is approximately equal to a 1% increase in regional inequality. Similarly, 
between-region component of total income inequality, as measured by Theil’s index, 
increases by 0.13 percentage points from 23.56 percent to 23.69 percent, which is a 
0.6% increase in spatial inequality. 
 Similarly, results from column 6 in Panel B of Table 2.7 suggest that an 
increase in the domestic supply access from median to 75th percentile increases wage 
premia by 61% in post 1991 period when evaluated at the wage premia of the region 
corresponding to the median domestic supply access. Doing a similar exercise as 
above implies an increase in the Gini-coefficient from 0.266 to 0.27, a 1.5% increase 
in regional disparities. In terms of Theil’s measure this translates into an increase of 
0.6 percentage points from 23.56 percent to 24.16, equal to a 2.5% increase in spatial 
inequality. 
                                                 
55 If the median value for domestic market access (and domestic supply access and ports) does not 
match with any region (which is likely to be the case since there are even number of regions), the 
region wage premia used for the exercise here correspond to market (supply) access immediately 




 A similar increase in proximity to ports evaluated at the wage premia 
corresponding to the median proximity to ports increases wage premia by 29%. This 
increase in proximity to ports does not have any effect on measures of inequality. 
2.7 Conclusion 
 As developing countries liberalize there is a debate about the distributional 
implications of the reforms. It is important to examine what factors contribute to the 
uneven sharing of gains from reforms. In this chapter, using household survey data 
from India over the period 1980-2000, we investigated whether superior location 
features, as measured by proximity to markets and sources of supply, result in higher 
region wage premia. In addition, using the case of reforms implemented in 1991, we 
examined if there is any heterogeneity in their effect in the post-reform period. We 
use a two-step estimation methodology, which has not been used in the context of 
spatial inequality in the existing literature. This approach allows for comparing 
workers with similar observable characteristics. 
 We find that the proximity to ports has a positive and a statistically significant 
effect on wages associated with a region, whereas greater access to domestic markets 
and suppliers do not have any statistically significant effect on region wage premia 
before liberalization. However, there are differences in their impact over the time 
period under study. We find that post reforms domestic measures of proximity have a 
positive and statistically significant impact on region wage premia. This is consistent 
with greater freedom to private investment activity in the post-reform period. Private 
investment, which is increasing its share over time in total investment, is more likely 




likely to increase inequalities in private investment which will contribute to 
inequalities in regional outcomes.  
 There is however weaker evidence of any additional effect on wages from 
greater proximity to ports in the post-1991 period. This is contrary to the results in the 
literature on industrial relocation in CEECs and Mexico, where studies have found 
increased importance of proximity to developed country markets after 
implementation of reforms. The results that we find here could be due to the time 
invariant measure of foreign market access. It could also be due to the fact that trade 
in goods has not increased as much as in the case of China or Mexico, and India’s 
growth has relied more on the domestic markets than exports.  
 Spatial features such as proximity to ports, domestic markets and suppliers 
contribute to the between-region component of total income inequality. We find that 
post-reforms the role of domestic market and supply access has become stronger and 
they have a positive and statistically significant impact on wages associated with a 
region. The effect of greater access to ports does not appear to have become any 
stronger post-reforms. This suggests that the share of the between-region component 
in the total income inequality will be higher, resulting in an increase in spatial income 
inequality, in the post-reform period. This has serious implications and some of which 
are already being seen on the ground.  
 A continued low growth rate for the poorer states and regions will lead to an 
increase in inequality and a regional concentration of poverty. This in turn will lead to 




of 31 states in India are witnessing Naxalite movements.56 Further, there are 
increasing demands for autonomous regions and new states from different parts of the 
country (three new states were created in 2001). This can lead to serious concerns 
about the sustainability of the growth process itself and put a question mark on the 
economic policy in general. This will not only strain and slow down the liberalization 
process but will also add to social tension as only some groups are seen to benefit at 
the expense of other groups and more so if regional inequalities align with splits in 
socio-economic groups. 
 There are several potential extensions of this work. NEG models require the 
use of transport costs in measuring proximity to markets and suppliers. In this paper, 
we use distance between regions as a proxy for transport costs. One possible line for 
future research could be to use a more direct measure of transport costs or to use time 
taken to travel between regions. Another possible extension is to examine the extent 
of diffusion of externalities. Further, deflators used in this study are at the state level 
price indices. The spatial unit used is a sub-state unit and to the extent that there are 
variations in prices across regions within the same state, using regional price index is 
another area in which this work can be extended. Also, as discussed above the ideal 
use of Banerjee-Iyer (2005) measure is as an instrument. Using more recent data on 
institutional quality and instrumenting it with the Banerjee-Iyer measure is another 
area for improvement.  
                                                 
56 Naxalite movement takes its name from a peasant uprising that took place in May 1967 at Naxalbari 
– a village in the state of West Bengal. Broadly, the objective of the movement is seizure of power 
through an agrarian revolution. Naxalite movement since its early days has been a violent struggle 





Chapter 3: Trade Liberalization and Wage Inequality: 
Evidence from India 
3.1 Introduction 
 A growing body of research indicates that trade liberalization by developing 
countries has raised their aggregate incomes.57 Academic and policy debates on the 
merits and demerits of liberalization have centered on the internal distributional 
consequences and on the question of how trade reforms affect labor markets. In this 
chapter we present new evidence from India on the impact of trade liberalization on 
wages.  
 India offers an excellent case to study the effects of trade liberalization for 
two reasons. First, the magnitude of trade liberalization in India was very big. In 
1991, after decades of pursuing an import-substitution industrialization strategy, India 
initiated a drastic liberalization of its external sector. The average tariff in 
manufacturing declined from 117 percent in 1990–91 to 39 percent in 1999–2000. 
The reduction in tariffs was much more drastic in India than in the trade liberalization 
episodes in Latin American countries like Mexico, Colombia, and Brazil. In addition 
to tariffs, India has also reduced non-tariff barriers (NTBs) since 1991. The average 
import coverage ratio (the share of imports subject to non-tariff barriers) declined 
from 82 percent in 1990–91 to 17 percent in 1999–2000.  
                                                 





 Second, the trade reforms in India were exogenous and came as a surprise to 
the policy makers. In response to a severe balance of payments crisis in 1991, India 
approached the International Mone tary Fund for assistance. The IMF support was 
conditional on structural reforms including trade liberalization, which India launched. 
The government’s objectives when reducing trade barriers were thus given by IMF 
conditionalities. From an industry perspective, the target tariff rates were exogenously 
predetermined and policymakers had less room to cater to special lobby interests. 
Hence, the Indian trade liberalization episode offers an excellent natural experiment 
to examine the impact of trade reforms on the labor market.  
 We use a dataset that combines micro- level data from the National Sample 
Survey Organization (NSSO) with data on international trade protection for the years 
1980–2000. The empirical strategy employed uses variation in industry wage premia 
and trade policy across industries and over time. Industry wage premia are defined as 
the portion of individual wages that accrues to the worker’s industry affiliation after 
controlling for worker characteristics. Since different industries employ different 
proportions of skilled workers, changes in wage premia translate into changes in the 
relative incomes of skilled and unskilled workers (Pavcnik et al. (2004), Goldberg 
and Pavcnik (2005)).  
 First, we analyze industry wage premia in the manufacturing sector in India. 
The main finding is that large differences in wages across industries exist for 
seemingly similar workers in terms of observable characteristics. Also, the structure 
of industry wage differentials in India has changed over time. Labor market rigidities 




 Next, we examine empirically the impact of trade liberalization on industry 
wage differentials. The existing studies on the relationship between trade policy and  
industry wage premia in developing countries yield mixed conclusions (e.g. Goldberg 
and Pavcnik (2005), Pavcnik et al. (2004), Feliciano (2001)). These studies find a 
positive or a statistically insignificant relationship between changes in trade policy 
and changes in wage differentials over time. In contrast, we find a strong and negative 
relationship between changes in trade policy and changes in wage differentials. The 
negative relationship is robust to instrumenting for tariffs and to including measures 
of non-tariff barriers. Our result is similar to Goh and Javorcik (2005) who find, in 
the case of Poland, that reduction in tariffs within an industry is associated with an 
increase in wage premium within that industry. However, unlike Goh and Javorcik 
(2005), our results are robust to using an instrumental variables strategy. 
 We also find that the magnitude of tariff reductions is relatively larger in 
sectors with a higher proportion of unskilled workers. Since the sectors with the 
largest tariff reductions experienced an increase in wages relative to the other sectors, 
this implies that the unskilled workers benefited relative to skilled workers. This 
intuition is confirmed by analyzing empirically the impact of trade liberalization on 
skilled and unskilled workers separately. Thus, our  findings suggest that trade 
liberalization, has led to decreased wage inequality through the wage premium 
channel in India. 
3.2 Predictions of the Theoretical Models 
 Trade liberalization could affect industry wage premia in perfectly 




(specific factors model). In this case, trade liberalization would reduce the relative 
returns to the factor specific to the sector in which tariffs are reduced more. Trade 
liberalization could also affect wages in perfect competition models if workers are 
heterogeneous. Reduction in tariffs could affect relative wages by changing the 
composition of workers.  
 Introducing imperfect competition in product and factor markets introduces 
additional channels through which trade liberalization can affect wage premia. Trade 
liberalization could affect wage premia by affecting capital or labor rents (Katz. et al. 
(1989)). It is also possible that unions extract part of the rents from protection in the 
form of more jobs rather than higher wages (McDonald and Solow (1981)). In this 
case, trade liberalization might not have any effect on relative wages but only affect 
employment. Grossman (1984) considers what happens when random layoff rules are 
replaced by seniority based layoff rules. Such a system induces senior workers to 
push for higher wages and junior workers to push for the low wages that prevent 
layoffs; the impact of trade liberalization then depends on the seniority structure of 
the union. 
 Liberalization induced productivity changes at the firm level may also impact 
industry wages. Most empirical work has established a positive link between 
liberalization and productivity (e.g., Harrison (1994) for Côte D’Ivoire, Krishna and 
Mitra (1998) for India, Pavcnik (2000) for Chile). The increased threat of foreign 
competition raises innovation incentives by domestic producers, forcing them to 




enhancements are passed through onto industry wages, relative wages would be 
positively correlated with trade liberalization. 
3.3 Empirical Strategy 
 The strategy to estimate the impact of trade policy on wages follows the 
industry wage premium methodology. The methodology has been used extensively in 
the trade and labor literature (Krueger and Summers (1988), Dickens and Katz 
(1987), Gaston and Trefler (1994), Goldberg and Pavcnik (2005), Pavcnik et al. 
(2004)). The idea is to exploit variation in wages and tariffs (and other trade policy 
measures) across industries and over time to identify the impact of trade on wages.
  The estimation has two stages. In the first stage, the log of individual worker 
i's wages, ln( )ijtw  (working in industry j  and observed at time t ) are regressed on a 
vector of the worker’s characteristics ( ijtX ) like education, age, gender, geographical 
location, occupation, dummy for whether the worker is self employed, and a set of 
industry indicators ( ijtI ) reflecting the worker’s industry affiliation: 
 ln( )ijt ijt Xt ijt jt ijtw X Iβ γ ε= + + .      (3.3.1) 
 The coefficient on the industry dummy, the wage premium ( jtγ ), captures the 
part of the variation in wages that is explained by the worker’s industry affiliation. 
Following Krueger and Summers (1988), the estimated wage premia are expressed as 
deviations from the employment-weighted average wage premium. The normalized 
wage premium can be interpreted as the proportional difference in wages for a worker 
in a given industry relative to the average worker in all industries with the same 




are calculated using the Haisken-DeNew and Schmidt (1997) two-step restricted least 
squares procedure. The first stage regressions are estimated separately for each year 
in the sample.  In the second stage, the industry wage premia for different years are 
pooled, and then regressed on tariffs, and other trade-related measures. The second 
stage regression is specified in first differenced form as: 
 jt jt jt t jtT Dγ η δ π ε∆ = ∆ + ∆ + +  .     (3.3.2) 
 Where, jtγ∆  is the change in industry wage premium for industry j  between 
1t − and t , jtT∆  is the change in tariffs in industry j  between 1t −  and t , jtD∆  
denotes the change in trade-related variables other than tariffs, tπ  is a vector of year 
indicators. The first differenced specification controls for unobserved industry 
specific heterogeneity. An additional concern could be that because there were other 
reforms such as de- licensing which were implemented at the same time, these other 
reforms could be correlated with changes in tariffs. However, de-licensing was 
introduced in one go and was implemented across industries. To that extent this is 
taken care of by the time indicators. On the other hand, changes in tariffs were not a 
one time treatment and were lowered over time. 
 The second stage regression is estimated using weighted least squares. The 
inverse of the standard error of the wage premium from the first stage are used as 





3.4 Data Description 
 The data on tariff and non-tariff barriers in India that we use is from Das 
(2003).58 This database covers 72 three-digit manufacturing industries, according to 
the National Industrial Classification 1987 (NIC-1987) for the period 1980–81 to 
1999–2000. Appendix C provides a list of industries for which tariff information is 
available. As discussed in Chapter 1 and shown in Figure 1.3 the percentage point 
reduction in average tariffs between 1990–91 and 1999–2000 was more drastic in 
India than in the Latin American countries. The level of protection also varied widely 
across industries. The standard deviation of the tariff rate was 0.23 in 1980–81 and 
this dropped to 0.06 in 1999-2000. 
 The trade reform also changed the structure of protection across industries. 
Figure 1.4 plots the tariffs in 1980–81 and 1999–2000 in various manufacturing 
industries. The tariffs declined in all the industries, and the decline differed across 
industries. Table 1.5 shows the correlations of tariffs over five-year periods since 
1980-81. 
 In addition to tariffs, India also reduced non-tariff barriers (NTBs) since 1991. 
The measure of non-tariff barriers used is the “import coverage ratio” which is 
defined as the share of imports subject to non-tariff barriers. The average import 
coverage ratio declined from 82 percent in 1990–91 to 17 percent in 1999–2000 
(Figure 1.5). 
 The household survey data is drawn from the Employment-Unemployment 
Schedule of the National Sample Survey Organization (NSSO) administered by the 
                                                 
58 Special thanks to Deb Kusum Das of Indian Council for Research in International Economic 




Government of India. We use data from four survey rounds conducted in 1983 (38th 
round), 1987–88 (43rd round), 1993–94 (50th round), 1999–2000 (55th round). The 
data are a repeated cross-section. The data provide information on weekly earnings, 
worker characteristics such as age, education, gender, marital status, occupation, 
industry of employment at three-digit National Industrial Classification (NIC-1987) 
and state of residence. We restrict attention to workers in the urban areas who work in 
the manufacturing sector.  The reason for restricting attention to workers in urban 
areas is that the analysis focuses on manufacturing (since the tariff reductions were 
largest in manufacturing, whereas agriculture has been relatively closed to trade 
liberalization), which is largely located in urban areas. We include workers between 
the ages of 15 and 65, who are a part of the labor force and report positive weekly 
earnings. The measure of wages is weekly earnings in rupees, which are deflated by 
the consumer price index from the International Financial Statistics. Based on 
completed years of schooling, workers are divided into three categories ?  (i) primary 
or less: at most 5 years of schooling (ii) middle or secondary: 6–10 years of schooling 
(iii) higher secondary or more: at least 11 years of schooling. Table 3.1 provides 
summary statistics. 
3.5 Results 
3.5.1 Estimation of Inter-industry Wage Premia 
 In the first stage, equation (3.3.1) is estimated separately for each round of the 
NSS. The logarithm of the individual worker’s wages are regressed on the dummies 




dummies for education, marital status, gender, occupation, whether the individual is 
the head of the household and the state of residence. The first stage regression results 
are shown in Table 3.2.  
 The bottom part of the table shows the R-squared for the regressions with and 
without industry dummies. For example, in 1999–2000, the R-squared for the 
regression excluding industry dummies is 0.50 i.e., the worker characteristics and 
state indicators alone explain about 50 percent of the variation in log weekly earnings. 
Adding the industry indicators increases the R-squared to 0.55 i.e., the industry 
indicators account for 5 percent of the total variation in log weekly earnings after 
controlling for worker characteristics. In general, the industry indicators explain about 
4 to 7 percent of the variation in log weekly earnings. 
 Appendix F shows the inter- industry wage premia for the 72 three digit 
industries for which we have tariff data. The wage premia are expressed as deviations 
from the employment weighted average wage premium. The standard errors are 
calculated by Haisken-DeNew and Schmidt (1997) procedure. The wage premia are 
jointly statistically significant at 1 percent level (p-value = 0.00) in all the years. 
Many of the wage premia are individually statistically significant as well. 
 There is, moreover, considerable dispersion in the wage premia across 
industries. The standard deviations range from 0.24 to 0.34 for the different years (see 
Table 3.1). In 1983, the three highest wage premium industries are zinc 
manufacturing, office, computing and accounting machinery, and ferro alloys, and the 
lowest wage industries are cotton spinning, matches, and weaving and finishing of 




manufacture of fertilizer and pesticides (industry code = 301) is 0.314, and the 
estimate of wage premium in weaving and finishing of cotton khadi (industry code = 
232) is –0.084. These estimates imply that a worker with the same observable 
characteristics switching from fertilizer and pesticides to khadi would observe a 
decline of 40 percent in weekly earnings (0.314-(-0.084)). 
 The structure of wage premia across industries has also changed over time. To 
examine the change in structure of the wage premia, we look at their year-to-year 
correlations in Table 3.3. The correlation between the wage premia in 1983 and 
1999–2000 is 0.26, and the correlation between the premia in 1987–88 and 1999–
2000 is 0.40. The Indian wage premia are much less correlated over time than the 
wage premia in United States and Brazil (Krueger and Summers (1998), Goldberg 
and Pavcnik (2005)). The correlation coefficients are of the order of 0.9 for the 
United States (between 1974 and 1984) and Brazil (between 1987 and 1998). The low 
correlation between the wage premia suggests that the structure of inter- industry 
wage premia changed significantly over time. Given that there were major trade 
reforms during the sample period, changes in trade policy could potentially constitute 
an explanation for the changing structure of the wage premia. 
 One possible explanation for the existence of wage premia in a developing 
country like India could be the lack of perfect mobility of labor across sectors. There 
is evidence of significant labor market rigidities in India (e.g., see Dutt (2003), Fallon 
and Lucas (1993), Topalova (2005)). India is ranked forty-fifth for the degree of labor 
market flexibility in the Global Competitiveness Report (GCR (1998)). Employment 




1947 (IDA). According to the 1982 amendment of the IDA, any firm employing 100 
or more workers requires permission from the government before laying off or 
retrenching its workers.  
 To test for evidence of labor reallocation between sectors, we also regress 
employment share of each industry, on tariff rates, industry and year indicators. The 
coefficient is 0.001 and is statistically insignificant. Thus, we do not find evidence for 
any significant employment sensitivity to trade shocks. This is consistent with the 
existence of labor market rigidities in other developing countries. Various studies 
from other countries like Mexico and Colombia have found similar results (Revenga 
(1997), Hanson and Harrison (1999), Attanasio et al. (2004)).  
 Another potential explanation for industry wage differentials could be varying 
degrees of union bargaining power across industries. If the industry wage differences 
are due to “strong” unions that can increase wages without suffering severe 
employment losses in certain industries, we would expect to find less variability in 
wages across industries for nonunion workers (Krueger and Summers (1988)). 
However, this is not the case for India. In India, in 1993–94, non-union workers have 
slightly higher wage dispersion (=0.389) than union workers (=0.340).59 Additionally, 
there is also evidence that unions are not very powerful in India (Dutt (2003)). The 
Trade Union Act of 1926 provides for the registration and operation of trade unions. 
This act allows any seven workers to register their trade unions. This has led to 
multiplicity of unions with outsiders playing a prominent role. There is no procedure 
to determine the representative union, which would serve as a single bargaining unit. 
                                                 






Also, the Industrial Disputes Act of 1947 confers upon the state the power to regulate 
labor-management relations. The inclusion of the state in the dispute settlement 
mechanisms complicates the bargaining process since the state itself is the dominant 
employer in the organized sector. 
3.5.2 Industry Wage Premia and Trade Policy: Preliminary Evidence 
 First we look at simple scatter plots to examine the characteristics of 
industries which had the greatest reduction in tariffs. Figure 3.1 shows the scatter plot 
for tariff reductions between 1983–84 and 1999–2000 and the tariffs in 1980. The raw 
data shows a strong and positive relationship between the tariff reduction in the two 
decades and the initial tariffs (coefficient=0.66, standard error=0.09) i.e., the 
magnitude of tariff reductions were greater in those industries with the highest initial 
tariff in 1980. Figure 3.2 shows the scatter plot for tariff reductions between 1983–84 
and 1999–2000, and the share of unskilled workers in 1983. Unskilled workers are 
defined as those having less than 11 years of completed schooling. The raw data show 
a strong and positive relationship between tariff reduction and share of unskilled 
workers i.e. the greatest tariff reductions were in sectors with the highest share of 
unskilled workers.  
 The tariff reductions were also the greatest in the low wage industries. Figure 
3.3 shows the relationship between the magnitude of the tariff reductions and the 
wage premia in 1983. There is a strong and negative correlation between the two 
(coefficient=-0.19, standard error =0.12). Figures 3.1–3.3 are consistent with the 
evidence from Colombia, Brazil, and Mexico. The existing studies on Colombia, 




industries with high pre- liberalization tariffs, low wage premia, and high share of 
unskilled workers (Goldberg and Pavcnik (2005), Pavcnik et al. (2004), Hanson and 
Harrison (1999)).60 
 Before analyzing the relationship between wage premia and trade policy in a 
regression framework, we look at the scatter diagram (Figure 3.4) relating changes in 
tariffs and changes in industry wage premia (1983 to 1987–88, 1987–88 to 1993–94, 
1993–94 to 1999-2000). Each point in the scatter plot represents the change in tariffs 
and the change in wage premia within an industry between two consecutive time 
periods. The plot illustrates a strong and negative relationship between changes in 
tariffs and wage premia. The raw data show that the change in wage premium is 
highest for those industries that had the greatest tariff reductions. 
3.5.3 Second Stage Regressions: Wage Premia and Tariffs 
 In the second stage regression, the estimated industry wage premia are 
regressed on tariffs, along with additional controls. The sample consists of all 
industries with available tariff information (72 industries). The results are shown in 
Table 3.4. Specification I shows the results for the first differenced specification 
corresponding to Equation 3.3.2. The first differenced specification accounts for 
unobserved time- invariant industry specific factors. Specification II shows the results 
in levels without the industry indicators. Specification III shows the results in levels 
with industry indicators. Year indicators are included in all the specifications.  
                                                 
60 In India, sectors with high share of unskilled workers which received more protection also had lower 
import penetration ratio. Grossman and Helpman (1994) political economy model of protection 
predicts a negative correlation between import penetration ratio and protection for organized sectors. 




 The estimate of the coefficient of tariffs is negative and statistically significant 
(at 5 percent in specifications I and III, and at 1 percent in specification II). The 
negative coefficient on tariffs implies that increasing protection in a particular 
industry lowers wages in that industry. A coefficient of -0.17 in Specification I 
indicates that if the tariffs are reduced from 50 percent to 0 percent in a sector, 
average wage in that sector increases by 8.5 percent (0.17x0.5). 
3.5.4 Controlling for Non-Tariff Barriers  
 As shown in Figure 1.5, non-tariff barriers (NTBs) were also an important part 
of the trade liberalization process in India. We augment the basic regression to 
include our measure of NTBs ? “import coverage ratio.” However, non-tariff barriers 
are plagued with measurement errors, primarily due to the lack of detailed data (the 
presence of NTBs is measured as a dummy variable which takes a value of 0 or 1). 
Hence we focus on tariffs as our principal measure of trade policy and check the 
robustness of the coefficient on tariffs by including NTBs. Introducing NTBs controls 
for the fact that tariffs could be capturing other forms of protection. In the pre-
liberalization period, during 1980-90, out of 72 manufacturing industries, only 10 had 
zero NTBs. All other industries had both NTBs and tariffs.  After 1990, NTBs have 
been phased out and tariffs are the only form of protection for most industries. 
 We also augment the basic regression with import penetration ratios (MPR, 
defined as imports/(output+imports-exports). Some of the effects of NTBs may be 
captured indirectly through the import measures. The results are shown in Table 3.5. 
These regressions include only those industries for which we have data on tariffs, 




negative and statistically significant (at least at 5 percent level) in all the 
specifications. The coefficient on the import coverage ratio is statistically 
insignificant in all the specifications. 
3.5.5 Endogeneity Issues 
 The industry fixed effects control for time- invariant unobserved industry 
specific heterogeneity. However, if there are unobserved time-varying industry 
specific factors that affect wages they are not controlled for in the empirical 
specification. If the time varying, industry-specific factors are uncorrelated with the 
tariff rates, then the coefficient of interest would be unbiased. However, if they are 
correlated with the tariff rates, then the estimates would be biased. Some examples 
could be political economy factors that simultaneously affect tariff formation and 
industry wages or tariff changes in other industries etc. To  address this concern, we 
apply an instrumental variables strategy. An ideal instrument should be highly 
correlated with tariffs and uncorrelated with the industry specific time-varying 
unobserved component of wages. 
 To construct industry-specific time varying instruments, we look at what 
constitutes variation in tariffs across sectors, and over time. The post-1991 trade 
reforms in India were in response to a severe balance of payments crisis. By mid-
1991, the foreign exchange reserves were only enough to sustain two-weeks of 
imports. India took external assistance from the IMF, and the trade reforms that 
followed were a part of the structural conditionalities agreed by India. Hence, the 
changes in foreign exchange reserves can be expected to be correlated with tariff 




instrument. The variation in foreign exchange reserves is also likely to uncorrelated 
with the unobserved component of wages. Figure 3.5 shows the evolution of foreign 
exchange reserves in India over time. 
 To explain the variation in tariff changes across sectors, following Goldberg 
and Pavcnik (2005), we use pre-reform tariffs in 1980 (1980 is the earliest period for 
which we have the tariff data), and the share of unskilled workers by industry (in 
1983) as a determinant of tariff changes. Figure 3.1 shows that the magnitudes of 
tariff reductions are positively correlated with the pre-reform tariff rates. Also, since 
we are using pre-reform tariffs, they are likely to be uncorrelated with wage changes 
in future periods from 1983-84 to 1999-2000. Similarly, the share of unskilled 
workers in 1983 is also correlated with the magnitude of tariff reductions (Figure 
3.2). Since we are using the initial share of unskilled workers, it is likely to be 
uncorrelated with wage change in future periods. We construct two industry-specific 
time varying instruments for tariff reductions: (i) interactions of foreign exchange 
reserves with tariff rates in 1980, and (ii) interactions of foreign exchange reserves 
with share of unskilled workers in 1983.  
 Table 3.6 shows the results from the instrumental variable regressions. In the 
first stage, Table 3.6.A, we relate the changes in tariffs (1983 to 1987–88, 1987–88 to 
1993–94, 1993–94 to 1999–2000) to the instruments. The first stage results indicate a 
strong and statistically significant relationship between the change in tariffs and the 
two instruments. The R-squared of the first stage regression is 0.64. The two 
identifying instruments are also jointly statistically significant in the first stage 




 Table 3.6.B shows the second stage results. The coefficient of tariff rate is 
negative and statistically significant at 1 percent. The magnitude of the estimate is 
bigger than the comparable non-IV estimate in Table 3.4 (Column I). Gaston and 
Trefler (1994) also find that the tariff coefficient becomes more negative when they 
instrument for trade protection using industry characteristics. We also do a test of 
over identifying restrictions to check the validity of the instruments. We fail to reject 
the over-identifying restrictions at 1 percent and 5 percent levels, thus supporting the 
validity of the instruments.61 
3.5.6 Additional Robustness Checks 
 One time varying and industry specific variable which can be expected to 
affect wage premia and also be correlated with tariff changes is sector-specific 
capital. To check the robustness of the results, we include gross fixed capital 
formation by sector as an additional regressor. Goldberg and Pavcnik (2005) also use 
gross fixed capital formation as a measure of capital accumulation in their study on 
Colombia. The data on gross fixed capital formation is taken from the Annual Survey 
of Industries (2002). The results are shown in Table 3.7. Gross fixed capital formation 
is included in levels for 1983–84, 1987–88 and 1993–94. The coefficient on tariffs is 
very similar to those in Tables 3.4 and 3.5 (Specification I). The coefficient on our 
measure of non-tariff barriers is also very similar to that in Table 3.5 (Specification I). 
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unskilled workers in the IV regression, and is 1.28 when we exclude difference in reserves interacted 
with tariffs in 1980 in the IV regression. The critical values of chi-squared with one degree of freedom 





Thus, the negative correlation between tariffs and wage premia is not driven by our 
measure of capital accumulation. 
3.5.7 Discussion of the Results 
 The negative relationship between tariffs and wage premia we find is similar 
to the results for Poland and United States. Goh and Javorcik (2005) also find that a 
decrease in industry tariff is associated with an increase in wage premium within that 
industry. However, unlike Goh and Javorcik (2005), our results are robust to using an 
instrument for trade protection. Gaston and Trefler (1994) also find a negative 
relationship between protection and wage premia in the U.S. manufacturing industries 
in 1983. They also control for the simultaneity bias in the cross-sectional data by 
instrumenting for trade protection. The coefficient on tariffs becomes more negative 
in the instrumental variable regressions. However, unlike Gaston and Trefler who 
examine the relationship between trade and industry wage premia using cross 
sectional data, we exploit both the variation across industries and over time which 
allows us to control for industry specific heterogeneity.  
 The results here are in contrast to earlier work on Colombia, Mexico and 
Brazil. In case of Colombia, Goldberg and Pavcnik (2005) find a positive and 
statistically significant relationship between tariffs and wage premia. In the case of 
Mexico, there is mixed evidence using data on workers earnings from two different 
sources. Revenga (1997) finds a positive relationship between industry wages and 
tariffs whereas Feliciano (2001) finds a negative but statistically insignificant 




Pavcnik et al. (2004) find a negative but statistically insignificant relationship 
between tariffs and wage premia. 
 Goldberg and Pavcnik (2005) find that the coefficient on tariffs is negative 
when industry indicators are not included in the estimation. When industry indicators 
are included, or when the regression is estimated in first differences, they find that the 
sign of the coefficient is reversed from negative to positive. The reversal of the sign 
of the coefficient when the model is estimated in first differences is interpreted as the 
importance of time invariant political economy determinants of tariffs. Similar to 
Goldberg and Pavcnik (2005), we also find that the coefficient is negative when we 
estimate the regression without differencing (i.e., without controlling for time 
invariant industry specific heterogeneity (see Table 3.4, Column II). However, unlike 
them, we find that the coefficient remains negative even after first differencing (Table 
3.4, Column I), but the magnitude of the coefficient does in fact decrease.  
 Dutt (2003) also looks at the impact of trade liberalization on wages in India. 
Unlike this study which uses detailed micro level data allowing us to control for 
worker characteristics, Dutt (2003) uses highly aggregated data on wages by industry. 
He finds a negative and statistically significant relationship between growth rate of 
wages and tariffs within a sector. He finds that reduction in tariffs is associated with 
an increase in wage growth within a three-digit industry. However, he does not find a 
statistically significant relationship between changes in wage levels and changes in 
tariffs. 
 Why has the impact of trade reform on worker wages in India been different 




structure of industry wages did not change over time. Pavcnik et al. (2004) suggest 
that this could be one possible explanation for the insignificant relationship between 
tariffs and industry wages in Brazil. Given that the structure of industry wage premia 
has changed over time in India as well, the significant relationship between trade 
policy and industry wage premia is not surprising. However, what is striking is the 
negative sign of the coefficient on tariffs unlike other developing countries. 
 The negative relationship between trade liberalization and industry wage 
differentials in the Indian case is consistent with liberalization induced productivity 
changes at the firm level. There is evidence that the 1991 trade reforms led to higher 
firm productivity in India (Krishna and Mitra (1998), Aghion et al. (2005), Topalova 
(2004)). Krishna and Mitra (1998) use firm-level data in the manufacturing sector 
from 1986-1993 and find some evidence of an increase in growth rate of productivity 
in the years following the reform. Aghion et al. (2005) use state- industry level data 
from 1980 to 1997 and find that the 1991 liberalization in India had strong 
inequalizing effects, by fostering productivity and output growth in 3-digit industries 
that were initially closer to the Indian productivity frontier and which were located in 
states with more pro-employer labor institutions.  Both Krishna and Mitra (1998) and 
Aghion et al. (2005) use a post-reform dummy to capture the effect of liberalization.  
Topalova (2004) uses a panel of firm-level data and detailed trade data from 1989-
2001 to examine the effect of India’s trade reforms in the early 1990s on firm 
productivity in the manufacturing sector. She finds that a reduction in tariffs leads to 




enhancements are passed on to industry wages, reductions in trade barriers would be 
associated with increase in wages within an industry.  
3.5.8 Implications for Wage Inequality between Skilled and Unskilled Workers  
 The relationship between trade policy and industry wage premia has important 
implications for the impact of trade liberalization on wage inequality. Since different 
industries employ different shares of skilled workers, changes in industry wage 
premia trans late into changes in relative incomes of skilled and unskilled workers. 
Since the tariff reductions were relatively larger in sectors with a higher proportion of 
unskilled workers (Figure 3.2) and these sectors experienced an increase in wages 
relative to other sectors, this implies that the unskilled workers experienced an 
increase in incomes relative to skilled workers. Thus, our findings suggest that trade 
liberalization has led to decreased wage inequality through the wage premium 
channel in India.  
 The intuition is confirmed when we repeat the regressions 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 
separately for skilled and unskilled workers. The results from the estimation of 3.3.2 
are shown in Table 3.8 (only the results from the first differenced specification are 
shown, the results are qualitatively similar for the other specifications). The results 
suggest that a reduction in tariffs within an industry is associated with increased wage 
premium for unskilled workers, but it leads to a decrease in wage premium for skilled 
workers. This supports our intuition that trade liberalization has led to decreased 





 This chapter investigates the effects of trade policy on wages in Indian 
manufacturing industries in the last two decades. The data set combines micro labor 
market data from the National Sample Survey with data on tariff and non-tariff 
barriers. Our results suggest that there is a statistically significant relationship 
between trade policy and industry wage premia. We find that increasing protection in 
a sector lowers wages in that sector. In sectors with largest tariff reductions, wages 
increased relative to the economy-wide average. The results are consistent with 
liberalization induced productivity increases at the firm level, which get passed onto 
industry wages. 
 The findings of this essay are in contrast to studies on other developing 
countries like Colombia, Brazil, and Mexico, which have found either a positive or an 
insignificant relationship between trade policy and industry wage premia. Our result 
is similar to the Gaston and Trefler (1994) study for the United States and Goh and 
Javorcik (2005) analysis for Poland, who find a negative relationship between tariffs 
and industry wage premium. However, unlike Gaston and Trefler who use a cross-
sectional data, our results are identified by using variation in wages and tariffs across 
industries as well as over time.  
 We also find that trade liberalization has led to decreased wage inequality 
between skilled and unskilled workers in India. This is consistent with our finding 
that tariff reductions were proportionately larger in sectors that employ a larger share 




an increase in wages relative to the other sectors, this implies that the unskilled 






Table 1.1: Annual Rates of Growth of Per Capita Gross State Domestic Product 








Uttar Pradesh 2.6 1.24
Orissa 2.38 1.64
Madhya Pradesh 2.08 3.87
Andhra Pradesh 3.34 3.45
Tamil Nadu 3.87 4.95
Kerala 2.19 4.52
Karnataka 3.28 3.45





14 states combined 3.03 4.02
Standard Deviation 0.67 1.84  
  Source: Ahluwalia (2000) 
Table 1.2: Regional Disparities in Income: Gini Coefficient and Generalized 
Entropy Measure  
Year Gini Coefficient
Total Between region 
(% of total)
1983 0.206 0.40 14.73
1987-88 0.297 1.13 13.50
1993-94 0.208 0.33 15.61
1999-00 0.266 0.44 23.56
Theil's Entropy Measure
 
Notes: Based on National Sample Survey (NSS) data for the urban manufacturing sector. 
Gini Coefficient is calculated assuming all individuals receive the average manufacturing 
wage of the region. Generalized entropy measure used for calculating inequality measure is 
the Theil entropy measure. Income shares are used as weights of the within-group component 





Table 1.3: Spatial Decomposition of Total Income Inequality: Cross Country 
Comparison 
















Finland 4 1971 0.127 12.5 87.5 Russia 77 1994 0.297 25 75
4 1981 0.076 6.3 93.7 77 1995 0.282 27 73
4 1990 0.069 7.6 92.4 77 1996 0.316 26 74
4 1993 0.075 7.3 92.7 77 1997 0.337 23 77
4 1998 0.104 4.4 95.6 77 1998 0.314 28 72
77 1999 0.329 31 69
India 58 1983 0.422 15.6 84.4 United 11 1991 0.152 7.2 92.8
58 1987/88 1.142 13.7 86.3 Kingdom 11 1995 0.213 12.2 87.8
58 1993/94 0.340 16.3 83.7 11 1996 0.286 7.7 92.3
58 1999/2000 0.441 23.6 76.4  
Source: Shorrocks and Wan (2005) for Finland, Russia, and United Kingdom. Author’s 
calculations for India. 
Table 1.4: Migration for Work/Employment 
All Intra-district Intra-state Inter-state
(inter-district)
Duration since migration (1) (2) (3) (4)
All 2.86 0.85 0.96 1.06
Less than 1 year 0.20 0.06 0.07 0.08
1-4years 0.68 0.20 0.22 0.26
5-9 years 0.51 0.16 0.17 0.19
Less than 10 years 1.39 0.42 0.45 0.52
All 7.09 1.53 2.52 3.03
Less than 1 year 0.23 0.05 0.08 0.10
1-4years 1.53 0.32 0.53 0.67
5-9 years 1.30 0.28 0.45 0.57
Less than 10 years 3.06 0.66 1.06 1.34
All 2.24 0.40 0.92 0.91
Less than 1 year 0.07 0.04 0.01 0.03
1-4years 0.52 0.09 0.21 0.21
5-9 years 0.41 0.08 0.17 0.16
Less than 10 years 1.00 0.21 0.39 0.40
(numbers represent migration as a % of total urban population)
Panel A: TOTAL-All India Migration
Panel B: Migration to Urban Areas from All India( Rural + Urban)
(numbers represent migration as a % of total urban population)
(numbers represent migration as a % of total all India population)
Panel C: Migration from Urban to Urban areas
 





Table 1.5: Sectoral Shares in Value Added and Employment 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Agriculture Manufacturing Industry Services Agriculture Industry Services
India 38.9 16.3 24.5 36.6 68.1 13.9 18.6
Brazil 11.0 33.5 43.8 45.2 29.3 24.7 46.1
China 30.1 40.5 48.5 21.4 68.7 18.2 11.7
Indonesia 24.0 13.0 41.7 34.3 55.9 13.2 30.2
Korea 15.1 28.6 40.5 44.4 34.0 29.0 37.0
Malaysia 22.6 21.6 41.0 36.3 37.2 24.1 38.7
Mexico 9.0 22.3 33.6 57.4 23.5 26.5 49.0
Thailand 23.2 21.5 28.7 48.1 70.8 10.3 18.9
Turkey 26.4 14.3 22.2 51.4 43.0 34.9 22.1
Low Income 36.4 14.8 24.4 39.2 74.6 8.7 16.5
Lower Middle Income 21.5 29.1 41.7 36.8 64.0 18.5 16.4
India 24.6 15.9 26.6 48.8 59.3 18.2 22.4
Brazil 7.3 17.1 28.0 64.7 24.2 19.3 56.5
China 16.4 34.7 50.2 33.4 46.9 23.0 29.9
Indonesia 17.2 24.9 46.1 36.7 45.3 17.3 37.3
Korea 4.3 26.1 36.2 59.5 10.9 28.0 61.0
Malaysia 8.8 32.6 50.7 40.5 18.4 32.2 49.5
Mexico 4.2 20.3 28.0 67.8 17.5 26.9 55.2
Thailand 9.0 33.6 42.0 49.0 48.8 19.0 32.2
Turkey 15.4 15.7 25.3 59.4 34.5 24.5 40.9
Low Income 27.3 14.1 26.6 46.1 64.5 12.3 23.2
Lower Middle Income 12.5 24.2 38.3 49.1 43.2 18.5 38.3
1980
2000
 Value Added as Percent of GDP Employment in Sector as Percent 
of Total Employment
 
Source: Kochhar et al. (2006) 
Table 1.6: Correlation of Tariffs over Time 
1980-81 1985-86 1990-91 1995-96 1999-00
1980-81 1.00
1985-86 0.72 1.00
1990-91 0.68 0.87 1.0
1995-96 0.61 0.63 0.62 1.0
1999-00 0.51 0.62 0.61 0.78 1.000
 






Table 2.1: Summary Statistics 
Variable Year Observations Mean Standard Deviation MinimumMaximum
wage 1983 8962 1.145 1.742 0.009 73.781
1987-88 8795 1.825 9.640 0.001 513.485
1993-94 8229 1.531 1.622 0.002 57.307
1999-00 7593 1.812 1.985 0.035 57.088
ownDMA 1983 58 0.000250 0.000273 0.000035 0.00131
1987-88 58 0.000244 0.000297 0.000016 0.00153
1993-94 58 0.000248 0.000257 0.000031 0.00131
1999-00 58 0.000251 0.000248 0.000050 0.00172
otherDMA 1983 58 0.001410 0.00035 0.00071 0.0034
1987-88 58 0.001402 0.00028 0.000704 0.0026
1993-94 58 0.001439 0.00041 0.00074 0.0036
1999-00 58 0.001404 0.00026 0.000756 0.0023
totalDMA 1983 58 0.001663 0.00045 0.000858 0.0036
1987-88 58 0.001646 0.00038 0.000863 0.0030
1993-94 58 0.001687 0.00050 0.000921 0.0039
1999-00 58 0.001655 0.00037 0.000921 0.0036
ownDSA 1983 58 0.000255 0.000359 0.000009 0.00211
1987-88 58 0.000251 0.000326 0.000005 0.00200
1993-94 58 0.000248 0.000294 0.000020 0.00160
1999-00 58 0.000254 0.000312 0.000007 0.00185
otherDSA 1983 58 0.001432 0.00050 0.000685 0.0043
1987-88 58 0.001454 0.00052 0.000713 0.0042
1993-94 58 0.001463 0.00054 0.000727 0.0046
1999-00 58 0.001477 0.00066 0.000743 0.0056
totalDSA 1983 58 0.001688 0.00064 0.000852 0.0046
1987-88 58 0.001705 0.00065 0.000911 0.0046
1993-94 58 0.001711 0.00066 0.000913 0.0049
1999-00 58 0.001731 0.00079 0.000831 0.0059
ownDCX 1983 58 0.000238 0.00019 0.00006 0.0010
1987-88 58 0.000237 0.00036 0.00002 0.0022
1993-94 58 0.000249 0.00023 0.00006 0.0015
1999-00 58 0.000250 0.00025 0.00005 0.0017
otherDCX 1983 58 0.001392 0.00024 0.000741 0.0020
1987-88 58 0.001370 0.00025 0.000694 0.0019
1993-94 58 0.001398 0.00024 0.000751 0.0020
1999-00 58 0.001402 0.00026 0.000756 0.0023
totalDCX 1983 58 0.001629 0.00032 0.000889 0.0030
1987-88 58 0.001606 0.00042 0.000819 0.0031
1993-94 58 0.001647 0.00034 0.000904 0.0034
1999-00 58 0.001653 0.00037 0.000919 0.0036
Ports (km) 58 0.00561 0.01206 0.000863 0.0778
Institutional Quality 58 0.53 0.44 0 1
Table 5: Summary Statistics
 





Table 2.2: First Stage Results from Earnings Regression 
1983 1987-88 1993-94 1999-00
Round 38 Round 43 Round 50 Round 55
Age 0.061*** 0.068*** 0.059*** 0.058***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007)
Age squared -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Female -0.662*** -0.571*** -0.639*** -0.449***
(0.033) (0.033) (0.045) (0.032)
Household head 0.152*** 0.165*** 0.209*** 0.128***
(0.021) (0.024) (0.028) (0.023)
Married 0.109*** 0.097*** 0.072** 0.069***
(0.022) (0.027) (0.034) (0.025)
Self-employed -0.262*** 0.105 -0.351*** -1.416***
(0.093) (0.102) (0.099) (0.131)
Middle or secondary school 0.301*** 0.356*** 0.252*** 0.243***
(0.020) (0.022) (0.024) (0.020)
Higher secondary or more 0.725*** 0.741*** 0.601*** 0.633***
(0.035) (0.039) (0.031) (0.030)
Constant -1.597*** -1.767*** -1.815*** -1.362***
(0.096) (0.105) (0.124) (0.124)
Region indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes
Occupation indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 8962 8795 8229 7460
P value for joint significance of region dummies 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
R-squared with region indicators 0.57 0.55 0.48 0.56
R-squared without region indicators 0.49 0.51 0.44 0.50  
Notes: Dependent variable is the log of real wages and the specification estimated is equation 
2.4.1.1. Age is the age of the individual in years, Age squared is the square of age, Female is 
a dummy variable which take the values 1 if the individual is a female and 0 otherwise, 
Married is a dummy variable for marital status of the individual and takes a value of 1 if 
married and 0 otherwise, Self-employed takes a value 1 if the individual is self-employed 0 
otherwise, household head takes a value 1 if the individual is a household and 0 otherwise, 
Middle or secondary school and Higher secondary or more are education dummies, former 
take the value 1 if individual has completed grades 6th-10th in school, and the latter takes a 
value 1 if individual has completed more than  11th grade or more (including college). ***, 








Table 2.3: Estimated Region Wage Premia 
Round Year Observations Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
38 1983 58 -0.052 0.253 -0.609 0.485
43 1987-88 58 -0.069 0.245 -0.546 0.440
50 1993-94 58 -0.032 0.289 -1.240 0.649
55 1999-00 58 -0.066 0.254 -0.676 0.492
Panel A: Summary Statistics
 
Round Year Round 38 Round 43 Round 50 Round 55
38 1983 1
43 1987-88 0.65 1
50 1993-94 0.40 0.47 1
55 1999-00 0.45 0.55 0.52 1
Panel B: Correlations over time
 
Notes: Region wage premia  are estimated region dummies obtained by estimating equation 
2.4.1.1. Following Krueger and Summers (1988) they are expressed as deviations from the 

















Table 2.4: Region Wage Premia and Total Market (Supply) Access as Measures of Proximity  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(totalDMA) 0.251*** 0.170** 0.397*** 0.306**
(0.085) (0.080) (0.133) (0.121)
ln(totalDSA) 0.292*** 0.213** 0.390*** 0.317***
(0.088) (0.083) (0.105) (0.096)
ln(Ports) 0.131*** 0.135*** 0.122*** 0.127*** 0.113*** 0.121*** 0.105** 0.112***
(0.041) (0.037) (0.045) (0.042) (0.036) (0.034) (0.039) (0.038)
Institutional quality 0.386** 0.338** 0.339** 0.282*
(0.153) (0.161) (0.157) (0.163)
Constant 2.271*** 1.455** 3.274*** 2.427*** 2.428*** 1.686*** 3.113*** 2.443***
(0.644) (0.619) (0.898) (0.846) (0.573) (0.582) (0.667) (0.654)
State indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes
State indicators*Time indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 232 232 232 232 232 232 232 232
R-squared 0.52 0.56 0.65 0.68 0.54 0.57 0.68 0.70
P-values:
Joint significance of state dummies 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Joint significance of interaction dummies 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Panel A: using totalDMA Panel B: using totalDSA
 
Notes: Dependent Variable is the normalized region wage premium. The regressions are weighted by the inverse of the standard 
errors of the normalized region wage premium. For Panel A and Panel B specification estimated is equation 2.4.1.2. TotalDMA 
includes both intermediate inputs (deflated by state GDP deflator) and consumer expenditure (deflated by state level CPI). 
Deflator used in measures of supply access is state GDP deflator. Robust and clustered (at the region level) standard errors are 




Table 2.5: Region Wage Premia and Other Market (Supply) Access as Measures of Proximity 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(otherDMA) 0.030 -0.014 0.090 0.048
(0.101) (0.102) (0.128) (0.125)
ln(otherDSA) -0.011 -0.069 0.041 -0.016
(0.110) (0.110) (0.117) (0.121)
ln(Ports) 0.149*** 0.143*** 0.159** 0.152*** 0.143*** 0.134*** 0.153** 0.143***
(0.051) (0.043) (0.061) (0.053) (0.051) (0.043) (0.061) (0.052)
Institutional quality 0.446*** 0.431** 0.458*** 0.438**
(0.157) (0.168) (0.157) (0.169)
Constant 0.945 0.251 1.500 0.820 0.636 -0.177 1.135 0.338
(0.819) (0.810) (1.035) (0.983) (0.877) (0.861) (0.961) (0.960)
State indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes
State indicators*Time indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 232 232 232 232 232 232 232 232
R-squared 0.49 0.55 0.61 0.65 0.49 0.55 0.61 0.65
P-values:
Joint significance of state dummies 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Joint significance of interaction dummies 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Panel A: using otherDMA Panel B: using otherDSA 
 
Notes: Dependent Variable is the normalized region wage premium. The regressions are weighted by the inverse of the standard errors of the 
normalized region wage premium. For Panel A and Panel B specification estimated is equation 2.4.1.2. OtherDMA includes both 
intermediate inputs (deflated by state GDP deflator) and consumer expenditure (deflated by state level CPI). Deflator used in measures of 
supply access is state GDP deflator. Robust and clustered (at the region level) standard errors are reported. ***, **, * represent significance 




Table 2.6: Region Wage Premia, Market and Supply Access 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(totalDMA) -0.013 -0.015 -0.338 -0.284
(0.141) (0.133) (0.305) (0.281)
ln(totalDSA) 0.300** 0.223* 0.638*** 0.528**
(0.136) (0.130) (0.238) (0.228)
ln(otherDMA) 0.155 0.200 0.316 0.474
(0.151) (0.142) (0.303) (0.301)
ln(otherDSA) -0.127 -0.220 -0.200 -0.380
(0.175) (0.163) (0.272) (0.280)
ln(Ports) 0.113*** 0.121*** 0.099** 0.107*** 0.147*** 0.139*** 0.158** 0.151***
(0.037) (0.035) (0.038) (0.037) (0.052) (0.044) (0.062) (0.053)
Institutional quality 0.339** 0.270 0.464*** 0.461***
(0.157) (0.167) (0.156) (0.164)
Constant 2.399*** 1.651** 2.482*** 1.942** 0.920 0.179 1.682 1.118
(0.663) (0.649) (0.908) (0.830) (0.849) (0.854) (1.057) (1.052)
State indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes
State indicators*Time indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 232 232 232 232 232 232 232 232
R-squared 0.54 0.57 0.68 0.70 0.50 0.55 0.61 0.66
P-values:
Joint significance of state dummies 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Joint significance of interaction dummies 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Panel B: otherDMA and otherDSA as 
measures of proximity
Panel A: totalDMA and totalDSA as 
measures of proximity
 
Notes: Dependent Variable is the normalized region wage premium. The regressions are weighted by the inverse of 
the standard errors of the normalized region wage premium. For Panel A and Panel B specification estimated is 
equation 2.4.1.2. TotalDMA and otherDMA include both intermediate inputs (deflated by state GDP deflator) and 
consumer expenditure (deflated by state level CPI). Deflator used in measures of supply access is state GDP 
deflator. Robust and clustered (at the region level) standard errors are reported. ***, **, * represent significance at 




Table 2.7.A: Region Wage Premium and Differential Impact of Market Access 
Post-liberalization 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
a) ln(otherDMA) 0.044 0.001 -0.079 -0.119 -0.127 -0.135
(0.131) (0.130) (0.145) (0.137) (0.142) (0.144)
b) ln(Ports) 0.150*** 0.143*** 0.158** 0.151*** 0.146*** 0.145***
(0.051) (0.043) (0.060) (0.052) (0.054) (0.054)
c) Institutional quality 0.446*** 0.430** 0.430** 0.510***
(0.158) (0.167) (0.168) (0.179)
d) ln(otherDMA)*Postlib -0.024 -0.025 0.377*** 0.374*** 0.391*** 0.411***
(0.099) (0.097) (0.128) (0.123) (0.138) (0.145)
e) ln(Ports)*Postlib 0.010 0.013
(0.036) (0.036)
f) Institutional quality*Postlib -0.195
(0.138)
Constant 1.041 0.349 0.373 -0.296 -0.379 -0.503
(0.969) (0.961) (1.113) (1.045) (1.109) (1.135)
State indicators Yes Yes
Time indicators Yes Yes
State indicators*Time indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 232 232 232 232 232 232
R-squared 0.49 0.55 0.62 0.67 0.67 0.67
P-values (F-test):
Joint significance of state dummies 0.00 0.00
Joint significance of interaction dummies 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
a) + d)=0 0.84 0.81 0.04 0.07 0.07 0.06
b) + e)=0 0.01 0.01
c) + f)=0 0.1
Panel A: otherDMA as measure of  domestic market access
 
Notes: Dependent Variable is the normalized region wage premium. The regressions are 
weighted by the inverse of the standard errors of the normalized region wage premium. For 
Panel A, 2.4.1.3 is estimated. otherDMA includes both intermediate inputs (deflated by state 
GDP deflator) and consumer expenditure (deflated by state level CPI). Postlib  is a dummy 
variable which takes the value 1 post 1991 and zero otherwise. Robust and clustered (at the 










Table 2.7.B: Region Wage Premium and Differential Impact of Supply Access 
Post-liberalization 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
a) ln(otherDSA) 0.019 -0.039 -0.103 -0.161 -0.165 -0.177
(0.113) (0.115) (0.129) (0.128) (0.131) (0.134)
b) ln(Ports) 0.145*** 0.135*** 0.151** 0.141*** 0.138** 0.136**
(0.052) (0.044) (0.061) (0.052) (0.053) (0.052)
c) Institutional quality 0.457*** 0.439** 0.439** 0.529***
(0.158) (0.168) (0.168) (0.178)
d) ln(otherDSA)*Postlib -0.055 -0.053 0.308*** 0.311*** 0.321*** 0.349***
(0.063) (0.062) (0.105) (0.095) (0.100) (0.105)
e) ln(Ports)*Postlib 0.007 0.012
(0.034) (0.033)
f) Institutional quality*Postlib -0.220
(0.136)
Constant 0.846 0.029 0.180 -0.627 -0.678 -0.846
(0.897) (0.896) (1.015) (0.994) (1.030) (1.061)
State indicators Yes Yes
Time indicators Yes Yes
State indicators*Time indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 232 232 232 232 232 232
R-squared 0.50 0.55 0.62 0.67 0.67 0.67
P-values (F-test):
Joint significance of state dummies 0.00 0.00
Joint significance of interaction dummies 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
a) + d)=0 0.76 0.42 0.15 0.29 0.28 0.23
b) + e)=0 0.01 0.01
c) + f)=0 0.01
Panel B: otherDSA as measure of  domestic supply access
 
Notes: Dependent Variable is the normalized region wage premium. The regressions are 
weighted by the inverse of the standard errors of the normalized region wage premium. 
Deflator used in measures of supply access is state GDP deflator. For Panel B specification 
estimated is equation 2.4.1.3. Postlib is a dummy variable which takes the value 1 post 1991 
and zero otherwise. Robust and clustered (at the region level) standard errors are reported. 










Table 2.7.C: Region Wage Premium and Differential Impact of Supply Access 
Post-liberalization 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
a) ln(otherDMA) 0.230 0.406 0.397 0.431
(0.395) (0.374) (0.381) (0.383)
b) ln(otherDSA) -0.277 -0.474 -0.476 -0.513
(0.336) (0.321) (0.324) (0.328)
c) ln(Ports) 0.157** 0.150*** 0.144*** 0.143***
(0.061) (0.052) (0.055) (0.054)
d) Institutional quality 0.463*** 0.463*** 0.551***
(0.163) (0.164) (0.173)
e) ln(otherDMA)*Postlib 0.244 0.206 0.227 0.155
(0.478) (0.464) (0.482) (0.486)
f) ln(otherDSA)*Postlib 0.123 0.160 0.160 0.242
(0.381) (0.364) (0.364) (0.364)
g) ln(Ports)*Postlib 0.013 0.016
(0.035) (0.034)
h) Institutional quality*Postlib -0.215
(0.135)
Constant 0.595 0.034 -0.066 -0.175
(1.203) (1.193) (1.273) (1.296)
State indicators*Time indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 232 232 232 232
R-squared 0.62 0.67 0.67 0.67
P-values (F-test):
Joint significance of interaction dummies 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
a) + e)=0 0.21 0.11 0.11 0.13
b) + f)=0 0.65 0.37 0.37 0.43
c) + g)=0 0.01 0.01
d) + h)=0 0.07
Panel C: otherDMA  and Other DSA as measures of  proximity
Notes: Dependent Variable is the normalized region wage premium. The regressions are 
weighted by the inverse of the standard errors of the normalized region wage premium. 
otherDMA includes both intermediate inputs (deflated by state GDP deflator) and consumer 
expenditure (deflated by state level CPI). Deflator used in measures of supply access is state 
GDP deflator. For Panel C specification estimated is equation 2.4.1.3. Postlib  is a dummy 
variable which takes the value 1 post 1991 and zero otherwise. Robust and clustered (at the 









Table 2.8.A: Robustness Checks with FMA_gdp as the Measure of Foreign 
Market Access 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
a) ln(otherDMA) -0.102 -0.140 -0.130 -0.136
(0.184) (0.174) (0.183) (0.184)
b) ln(FMA_gdp) 2.853** 2.759** 2.880** 2.851**
(1.390) (1.118) (1.149) (1.139)
c) Institutional quality 0.446*** 0.445*** 0.509***
(0.163) (0.165) (0.176)
d) ln(otherDMA)*Postlib 0.420*** 0.415*** 0.390** 0.403**
(0.130) (0.121) (0.163) (0.169)
e) ln(FMA_gdp)*Postlib -0.263 -0.242
(0.992) (1.013)
f) Institutional quality*Postlib -0.154
(0.141)
Constant 24.963* 23.490** 24.643** 24.285**
(12.748) (10.171) (10.582) (10.519)
State indicators*Time indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 232 232 232 232
R-squared 0.59 0.64 0.64 0.64
P-values (F-test):
Joint significance of interaction dummies 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
a) + d)=0 0.07 0.10 0.14 0.13
b) + e)=0 0.05 0.06
c) + f)=0 0.06
Panel A: otherDMA as measure of  domestic market access
 
Notes: Dependent Variable is the normalized region wage premium. The regressions are 
weighted by the inverse of the standard errors of the normalized region wage premium. For 
Panel A, 2.4.1.3 is estimated. otherDMA includes both intermediate inputs (deflated by state 
GDP deflator) and consumer expenditure (deflated by state level CPI). FMA_gdp is used as a 
measure of access to foreign markets. Postlib is a dummy variable which takes the value 1 
post 1991 and zero otherwise. Robust and clustered (at the region level) standard errors are 









Table 2.8.B: Robustness Checks with FMA_gdp as the Measure of Foreign 
Supply Access 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
a) ln(otherDSA) -0.127 -0.186 -0.178 -0.190
(0.177) (0.171) (0.171) (0.173)
b) ln(FMA_gdp) 2.725* 2.532** 2.641** 2.592**
(1.423) (1.138) (1.100) (1.083)
c) Institutional quality 0.455*** 0.454*** 0.531***
(0.163) (0.164) (0.174)
d) ln(otherDSA)*Postlib 0.360*** 0.360*** 0.341*** 0.364***
(0.112) (0.100) (0.119) (0.121)
e) ln(FMA_gdp)*Postlib -0.245 -0.180
(0.860) (0.858)
f) Institutional quality*Postlib -0.185
(0.135)
Constant 23.644* 21.146** 22.175** 21.598**
(13.054) (10.347) (9.996) (9.864)
State indicators*Time indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 232 232 232 232
R-squared 0.59 0.64 0.64 0.64
P-values:
P-values (F-test):
Joint significance of interaction dummies 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
a) + d)=0 0.20 0.32 0.37 0.34
b) + e)=0 0.08 0.09
c) + f)=0 0.07
Panel B: otherDSA as measure of  domestic supply access
 
Notes: Dependent Variable is the normalized region wage premium. The regressions are 
weighted by the inverse of the standard errors of the normalized region wage premium. 
Deflator used in measures of supply access is state GDP deflator. For Panel B specification 
estimated is equation 2.4.1.3. FMA_gdp is used as a measure of access to foreign sources of 
supply. Postlib is a dummy variable which takes the value 1 post 1991 and zero otherwise. 
Robust and clustered (at the region level) standard errors are reported. ***, **, * represent 








Table 2.9.A: Robustness Checks with Domestic Access Markets Excluding 
Regions with Big Ports (otherDMA_minusports) 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
a) ln(otherDMA_minusports) 0.026 0.031 0.040 0.040
(0.110) (0.111) (0.111) (0.112)
b) ln(Ports) 0.153*** 0.152*** 0.166*** 0.166***
(0.056) (0.048) (0.053) (0.053)
c) Institutional quality 0.434** 0.434** 0.499***
(0.166) (0.166) (0.176)
d) ln(otherDMA_minusports)*Postlib 0.242** 0.234** 0.218* 0.218*
(0.110) (0.115) (0.113) (0.116)
e) ln(Ports)*Postlib -0.033 -0.032
(0.036) (0.036)
f) Institutional quality*Postlib -0.157
(0.133)
Constant 1.052 0.714 0.860 0.810
(0.900) (0.869) (0.903) (0.911)
State indicators*Time indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 232 232 232 232
R-squared 0.62 0.67 0.67 0.67
P-values (F-test):
Joint significance of interaction dummies 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
a) + d)=0 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
b) + e)=0 0.01 0.01
c) + f)=0 0.07
Panel A: otherDMA as measure of  domestic market access
 
Notes: Dependent Variable is the normalized region wage premium. The regressions are 
weighted by the inverse of the standard errors of the normalized region wage premium. For 
Panel A, 2.4.1.3 is estimated. otherDMA_minusports includes both intermediate inputs 
(deflated by state GDP deflator) and consumer expenditure (deflated by state level CPI). 
otherDMA_minusports does not include access to regions associated with any of the big 
ports. Ports, which is the inverse of the distance to the closest port, is used as a measure of 
access to foreign markets. Postlib is a dummy variable which takes the value 1 post 1991 and 
zero otherwise. Robust and clustered (at the region level) standard errors are reported. ***, 









Table 2.9.B: Robustness Checks with Domestic Supply Access Excluding 
Regions with Big Ports (otherDSA_minusports) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
a) ln(otherDSA_minusports) 0.018 0.005 0.009 0.007
(0.088) (0.086) (0.085) (0.086)
b) ln(Ports) 0.151*** 0.149*** 0.164*** 0.164***
(0.055) (0.047) (0.053) (0.053)
c) Institutional quality 0.426** 0.426** 0.498***
(0.167) (0.167) (0.177)
d) ln(otherDSA_minusports)*Postlib 0.201** 0.198** 0.190** 0.195**
(0.095) (0.094) (0.092) (0.094)
e) ln(Ports)*Postlib -0.035 -0.034
(0.036) (0.035)
f) Institutional quality*Postlib -0.174
(0.133)
Constant 0.984 0.525 0.644 0.568
(0.775) (0.713) (0.739) (0.745)
State indicators*Time indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 232 232 232 232
R-squared 0.62 0.67 0.67 0.67
P-values (F-test):
Joint significance of interaction dummies 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
a) + d)=0 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.06
b) + e)=0 0.01 0.01
c) + f)=0 0.09
Panel B: otherDSA as measure of  domestic supply access
 
Notes: Dependent Variable is the normalized region wage premium. The regressions are 
weighted by the inverse of the standard errors of the normalized region wage premium. 
Deflator used in measures of supply access is state GDP deflator. For Panel B specification 
estimated is equation 2.4.1.3. otherDSA_minusports does not include access to regions 
associated with any of the big ports. Ports, which is the inverse of the distance to the closest 
port, is used as a measure of foreign supply access. Postlib is a dummy variable which takes 
the value 1 post 1991 and zero otherwise. Robust and clustered (at the region level) standard 








Table 2.10.A: Using otherDMA as an Instrument for totalDMA : Second Stage 
Regressions  
(1) (2) (3) (4)
a) ln(totalDMA) -0.287 -0.371 -0.216 -0.238
(0.281) (0.297) (0.185) (0.191)
b) ln(Ports) 0.156*** 0.159*** 0.184*** 0.185***
(0.037) (0.036) (0.043) (0.043)
c) Institutional quality 0.459*** 0.442*** 0.580***
(0.115) (0.104) (0.151)
d) ln(totalDMA)*Postlib 0.788** 0.824** 0.542** 0.588***
(0.397) (0.401) (0.215) (0.226)
e) ln(Ports)*Postlib -0.070 -0.071
(0.052) (0.052)
f) Institutional quality*Postlib -0.332*
(0.191)
Constant -0.984 -1.894 -0.727 -0.976
(1.708) (1.853) (1.148) (1.204)
State indicators*Time indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 232 232 232 232
P-values (F-test):
Joint significance of interaction dummies 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
a) + d)=0 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00
b) + e)=0 0.00 0.03
c) + f)=0 0.01
Panel A: totalDMA as measure of  domestic market access
 
Notes: Dependent Variable is the normalized region wage premium. The regressions are 
weighted by the inverse of the standard errors of the normalized region wage premium. For 
Panel A, 2.4.1.3 is estimated. totalDMA is used as a measure of domestic market access and it 
is instrumented with otherDMA. They include both intermediate inputs (deflated by state 
GDP deflator) and consumer expenditure (deflated by state level CPI). Ports, which is the 
inverse of the distance to the closest port, is used as a measure of access to foreign markets. 
Postlib is a dummy variable which takes the value 1 post 1991 and zero otherwise. Robust 










Table 2.10.B: Using otherDSA as an Instrument for totalDSA: Second Stage 
Regressions  
(1) (2) (3) (4)
a) ln(totalDSA) -0.269 -0.372 -0.238 -0.268
(0.236) (0.270) (0.161) (0.173)
b) ln(Ports) 0.158*** 0.167*** 0.198*** 0.202***
(0.040) (0.042) (0.050) (0.051)
c) Institutional quality 0.483*** 0.467*** 0.627***
(0.125) (0.110) (0.158)
d) ln(totalDSA)*Postlib 0.623* 0.667* 0.416** 0.479**
(0.336) (0.361) (0.189) (0.207)
e) ln(Ports)*Postlib -0.087 -0.092
(0.058) (0.059)
f) Institutional quality*Postlib -0.385*
(0.203)
Constant -0.846 -1.868 -0.800 -1.107
(1.387) (1.638) (0.959) (1.041)
State indicators*Time indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 232 232 232 232
P-values (F-test):
Joint significance of interaction dummies 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
a) + d)=0 0.02 0.04 0.11 0.06
b) + e)=0 0.00 0.00
c) + f)=0 0.06
Panel B: totalDSA as measure of  domestic supply access
 
Notes: Dependent Variable is the normalized region wage premium. The regressions are 
weighted by the inverse of the standard errors of the normalized region wage premium. 
Deflator used in measures of supply access is state GDP deflator. For Panel B specification 
estimated is equation 2.4.1.3. totalDSA is used as a measure of domestic market access and it 
is instrumented with otherDSA.  Ports, which is the inverse of the distance to the closest port, 
is used as a measure of foreign supply access. Postlib  is a dummy variable which takes the 
value 1 post 1991 and zero otherwise. Robust standard errors are reported. ***, **, * 










Table 2.11: Robustness Checks with Only Consumer Expenditure as the 
Measure of Domestic Market Access  
(1) (2) (3) (4)
a) ln(otherDCX) -0.040 -0.050 -0.053 -0.054
(0.156) (0.149) (0.157) (0.158)
b) ln(Ports) 0.163*** 0.160*** 0.158*** 0.158***
(0.060) (0.053) (0.057) (0.056)
c) Institutional quality 0.428** 0.428** 0.499***
(0.167) (0.168) (0.179)
d) ln(otherDCX)*Postlib 0.381** 0.366** 0.373* 0.381*
(0.172) (0.169) (0.200) (0.206)
e) ln(Ports)*Postlib 0.003 0.005
(0.040) (0.041)
f) Institutional quality*Postlib -0.172
(0.138)
Constant 0.655 0.211 0.185 0.115
(1.171) (1.120) (1.219) (1.236)
State indicators*Time indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 232 232 232 232
R-squared 0.62 0.67 0.67 0.67
P-values (F-test):
Joint significance of interaction dummies 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
a) + d)=0 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.05
b) + e)=0 0.01 0.01
c) + f)=0 0.09
otherDCX as measure of  domestic market access
 
Notes: Dependent Variable is the normalized region wage premium. The regressions are 
weighted by the inverse of the standard errors of the normalized region wage premium. 
Equation 2.4.1.3 is estimated. otherDCX includes only consumer expenditure (deflated by 
state level CPI). Postlib is a dummy variable which takes the value 1 post 1991 and zero 
otherwise. Robust and clustered (at the region level) standard errors are reported. ***, **, * 









Table 2.12.A: Robustness Checks including the Rural Sample with OtherDMA  as 
Measure of Domestic Market Access 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
a) ln(otherDMA) -0.177 -0.253* -0.258* -0.255*
(0.160) (0.147) (0.148) (0.149)
b) ln(Ports) 0.109* 0.100** 0.097** 0.098**
(0.057) (0.046) (0.044) (0.045)
c) Institutional quality 0.561*** 0.562*** 0.542***
(0.089) (0.090) (0.106)
d) ln(otherDMA)*Postlib 0.390*** 0.393*** 0.402*** 0.396***
(0.109) (0.096) (0.103) (0.104)
e) ln(Ports)*Postlib 0.005 0.004
(0.020) (0.020)
f) Institutional quality*Postlib 0.046
(0.076)
Constant -0.516 -1.518 -1.570 -1.529
(1.201) (1.116) (1.113) (1.130)
State indicators*Time indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 232 232 232 232
R-squared 0.61 0.71 0.71 0.71
P-values (F-test):
Joint significance of interaction dummies 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
a) + d)=0 0.14 0.31 0.31 0.32
b) + e)=0 0.05 0.04
c) + f)=0 0.00
Panel A: otherDMA as measure of  domestic market access
 
Notes: Dependent Variable is the normalized region wage premium. The regressions are 
weighted by the inverse of the standard errors of the normalized region wage premium. For 
Panel A, 2.4.1.3 is estimated. otherDMA includes both intermediate inputs (deflated by state 
GDP deflator) and consumer expenditure (deflated by state level CPI). Postlib  is a dummy 
variable which takes the value 1 post 1991 and zero otherwise. Robust and clustered (at the 










Table 2.12.B: Robustness Checks including the Rural Sample with OtherDSA as 
Measure of Domestic Supply Access 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
a) ln(otherDSA) -0.132 -0.248* -0.252* -0.250*
(0.146) (0.137) (0.139) (0.141)
b) ln(Ports) 0.111* 0.097** 0.094** 0.095**
(0.058) (0.045) (0.044) (0.044)
c) Institutional quality 0.575*** 0.575*** 0.568***
(0.091) (0.092) (0.109)
d) ln(otherDSA)*Postlib 0.318*** 0.342*** 0.349*** 0.346***
(0.096) (0.077) (0.080) (0.083)
e) ln(Ports)*Postlib 0.004 0.004
(0.019) (0.020)
f) Institutional quality*Postlib 0.017
(0.076)
Constant -0.201 -1.498 -1.538 -1.519
(1.120) (1.042) (1.060) (1.085)
State indicators*Time indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 232 232 232 232
R-squared 0.61 0.71 0.71 0.71
P-values (F-test):
Joint significance of interaction dummies 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
a) + d)=0 0.16 0.47 0.46 0.47
b) + e)=0 0.05 0.05
c) + f)=0 0.00
Panel B: otherDSA as measure of  domestic supply access
 
Notes: Dependent Variable is the normalized region wage premium. The regressions are 
weighted by the inverse of the standard errors of the normalized region wage premium. 
Deflator used in measures of supply access is state GDP deflator. For Panel B specification 
estimated is equation 2.4.1.3. Postlib is a dummy variable which takes the value 1 post 1991 
and zero otherwise. Robust and clustered (at the region level) standard errors are reported. 








Table 2.13.A: Robustness Checks using Alternative Price Deflators with OtherDMA  as Measure of Domestic Market Access 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
a) ln(otherDMA) -0.065 -0.095 -0.102 -0.107 -0.068 -0.093 -0.099 -0.103
(0.152) (0.144) (0.150) (0.151) (0.152) (0.144) (0.150) (0.151)
b) ln(Ports) 0.160** 0.155*** 0.151*** 0.150*** 0.160** 0.155*** 0.151*** 0.151***
(0.060) (0.052) (0.055) (0.055) (0.060) (0.052) (0.056) (0.055)
c) Institutional quality 0.428** 0.428** 0.504*** 0.426** 0.426** 0.503***
(0.168) (0.168) (0.180) (0.168) (0.168) (0.179)
d) ln(otherDMA)*Postlib 0.384** 0.376** 0.390** 0.406** 0.386** 0.372** 0.385** 0.400**
(0.148) (0.144) (0.167) (0.173) (0.148) (0.145) (0.168) (0.173)
e) ln(Ports)*Postlib 0.008 0.011 0.008 0.010
(0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038)
f) Institutional quality*Postlib -0.186 -0.186
(0.138) (0.137)
Constant 0.477 -0.113 -0.180 -0.283 0.457 -0.096 -0.159 -0.254
(1.155) (1.085) (1.165) (1.188) (1.157) (1.088) (1.169) (1.188)
State indicators*Time indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 232 232 232 232 232 232 232 232
R-squared 0.62 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.62 0.67 0.67 0.67
P-values (F-test):
Joint significance of interaction dummies 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
a) + d)=0 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.05
b) + e)=0 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
c) + f)=0 0.09 0.1
Using CPI as Deflator
Panel A: otherDMA as measure of  domestic market access
Using state GDP Deflator
 
Notes: Dependent Variable is the normalized region wage premium. The regressions are weighted by the inverse of the standard errors of the normalized region 
wage premium. For Panel A estimating equation is 2.4.1.3. otherDMA includes both intermediate inputs and consumer expenditure (both deflated using the same 
deflators). Postlib is a dummy variable which takes the value 1 post 1991 and zero otherwise. Robust and clustered (at the region level) standard errors are 




Table 2.13.B: Robustness Checks using Alternative Price Deflators with 
OtherDSA as Measure of Domestic Supply Access 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
a) ln(otherDSA) -0.102 -0.163 -0.169 -0.181
(0.128) (0.127) (0.129) (0.132)
b) ln(Ports) 0.151** 0.141*** 0.137** 0.135**
(0.061) (0.052) (0.053) (0.052)
c) Institutional quality 0.441** 0.441** 0.532***
(0.168) (0.169) (0.178)
d) ln(otherDSA)*Postlib 0.310*** 0.315*** 0.326*** 0.355***
(0.105) (0.096) (0.100) (0.104)
e) ln(Ports)*Postlib 0.009 0.014
(0.034) (0.032)
f) Institutional quality*Postlib -0.222
(0.136)
Constant 0.183 -0.648 -0.709 -0.884
(1.011) (0.986) (1.022) (1.056)
State indicators*Time indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 232 232 232 232
R-squared 0.62 0.67 0.67 0.67
P-values (F-test):
Joint significance of interaction dummies 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
a) + d)=0 0.15 0.29 0.28 0.23
b) + e)=0 0.01 0.01
c) + f)=0 0.1
Panel B: otherDSA as measure of  domestic supply access
Using CPI as Deflator
 
Notes: Dependent Variable is the normalized region wage premium. The regressions are 
weighted by the inverse of the standard errors of the normalized region wage premium. 
Deflator used in measures of supply access is CPI. For Panel B specification estimated is 
equation 2.4.1.3. Postlib  is a dummy variable which takes the value 1 post 1991 and zero 
otherwise. Robust and clustered (at the region level) standard errors are reported. ***, **, * 








Table 2.14: Quantification of Estimates 
otherDMA 0.276 0.001395 -6.575 0.001523 -6.487 -0.055 44%
Ports 0.158 0.002442 -6.015 0.004519 -5.399 -0.320 30.4%
otherDSA 0.172 0.001429 -6.551 0.001590 -6.444 -0.030 61%
Ports 0.148 0.002442 -6.015 0.004519 -5.399 -0.320 28.5%
Variable
Results from Table 2.7, Panel B, Column 6
Results from Table 2.7, Panel A, Column 6
75th 
percentile





















1983 72 0.129 0.278 -0.978 0.851
1987-88 72 0.110 0.338 -1.081 0.858
1993-94 72 0.135 0.283 -0.744 0.807
1999-00 65 0.108 0.240 -0.381 0.689
1983 72 1.109 0.261 0.600 1.560
1987-88 72 1.122 0.260 0.555 1.900
1993-94 72 0.692 0.152 0.350 0.850
1999-00 65 0.394 0.055 0.273 0.467
1983 60 95.000 21.978 0 100
1987-88 60 88.986 26.619 0 100
1993-94 60 38.413 42.008 0 100
1999-00 56 17.950 34.530 0 100
1983 60 0.180 0.248 0 1.341
1987-88 60 0.123 0.145 0 0.494
1993-94 60 0.149 0.177 0 0.733
1999-00 56 0.161 0.177 0 0.641
1983 65 7.213 2.196 0 11.370
1987-88 69 7.712 1.868 1.609 11.693
1993-94 72 8.957 1.718 4.263 13.225









Nominal Rate of 
Protection (NRP)
 








Table 3.2: Results from the Earnings Regression 
1983 1987-88 1993-94 1999-00
Age 0.055 *** 0.065 *** 0.055 *** 0.049 ***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
Age squared -0.001 *** -0.001 *** -0.001 *** -0.001 ***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Female -0.576 *** -0.515 *** -0.507 *** -0.411 ***
(0.023) (0.025) (0.028) (0.024)
Married 0.111 *** 0.106 *** 0.091 *** 0.095 ***
(0.018) (0.021) (0.024) (0.020)
Self-employed -0.215 *** -0.058 *** -0.335 *** -1.294 ***
(0.053) (0.061) (0.064) (0.127)
Household  head 0.177 *** 0.098 *** 0.194 *** 0.129 ***
(0.017) (0.019) (0.022) (0.018)
0.281 *** 0.289 *** 0.246 *** 0.225 ***
(0.015) (0.017) (0.020) (0.016)
0.685 *** 0.673 *** 0.613 *** 0.600 ***
(0.032) (0.030) (0.028) (0.022)
Constant -0.160 -1.103 * -0.692 *** -0.393 ***
(0.0320) (0.6580) (0.1730) (0.094)
State indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes
Occupation indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared with industry 
indicators 0.59 0.56 0.5 0.55
R-squared without 
industry indicators 0.52 0.5 0.44 0.5
Number of observations 9309 9083 8570 7855
Middle or secondary 
school
Higher secondary or 
more
 
Notes: Dependent variable is the log of weekly earning of each individual. Equation 
estimated is equation 3.3.1. Age is the age of the individual in years, Age squared is the 
square of age, Female  is a dummy variable which take the values 1 if the individual is a 
female and 0 otherwise, Married is a dummy variable for marital status of the individual and 
takes a value of 1 if married and 0 otherwise, Self-employed takes a value 1 if the individual 
is self-employed 0 otherwise, household head takes a value 1 if the individual is a household 
and 0 otherwise, Middle or secondary school and Higher secondary or more are education 
dummies, former take the value 1 if individual has completed grades 6th-10th in school, and 
the latter takes a value 1 if individual has completed more than  11th grade or more (including 
college). ***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Standard 




 Table 3.3: Correlation Matrix for Industry Wage Premia 
1983 1987-88 1993-94 1999-00
1983 1
1987-88 0.48 1
1993-94 0.36 0.48 1
1999-00 0.26 0.40 0.43 1
 
Notes: Based on Authors’ calculations of inter-industry wage premia  calculated 






















Table 3.4: Tariffs and Industry Wage Premia 
I II III
NRP -0.174 ** -0.435 *** -0.153 **
(0.07) (0.10) (0.07)
Year indicators Yes Yes Yes
Industry indicators No No Yes
First differencing Yes No No
Observations 209 281 281
 
Notes: Dependent variable in all regressions is the inter-industry wage 
premium calculated from Mincer wage regressions. Equation 3.3.2 has been 
estimated here. NRP is the nominal rate of protection. ***, **, * denote 
statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Standard errors are 
reported in parentheses. 
Table 3.5: Tariffs and Industry Wage Premia: Controlling for Non-Tariff 
Barriers (NTB) and Import Penetration Ratio (MPR) 
I II III
NRP -0.198** -0.386*** -0.146**
(0.079) (0.1) (0.072)
MCR -0.0004 0.0002 -0.0001
(0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0004)
MPR -0.129 0.114 0.081
(0.101) (0.118) (0.119)
Year indicators Yes Yes Yes
Industry indicators No No Yes
First differencing Yes No No
Observations 176 236 236  
Notes: Dependent variable in all regressions is the inter-industry wage 
premium calculated from Mincer wage regressions. Equation 3.3.2 has 
been estimated here. NRP is the nominal rate of protection, MCR is the 
import coverage ratio (measure of Non-tariff barriers (NTBs)), MPR is 
the import penetration ratio. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at 
















NRP in 1980*Foreign Exchange 
Reserves
Share of Unskilled Workers in 
1983*Foreign Exchange Reserves
 
Notes: Dependent variable is the nominal rate of protection. Equation 3.3.2 has been 
estimated here. NRP, the nominal rate of protection is instrumented with NRP in 1980 
interacted with foreign exchange reserves and share of unskilled workers in 1983 interacted 
with foreign exchange reserves. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 
respectively. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
 
 
Table 3.6.B: Tariffs and Industry Wage Premia: Instrumental Variable 









Notes: Dependent variable in all regressions is the inter-industry wage premium calculated 
from Mincer wage regressions. Equation 3.3.2 has been estimated here. NRP, the nominal 
rate of protection is instrumented with NRP in 1980 interacted with foreign exchange 
reserves and share of unskilled workers in 1983 interacted with foreign exchange reserves. 
***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Standard errors are 






Table 3.7: Tariffs and Industry Wage Premia: Controlling for Gross Fixed 
Capital Formation 
I II








Year indicators Yes Yes
Industry indicators No No
First differencing Yes Yes
Observations 199 167
 
Notes: Dependent variable in all regressions is the inter-industry wage premium calculated 
from Mincer wage regressions (available from authors upon request). Equation 3.3.2 has been 
estimated here. NRP is the nominal rate of protection, MCR is the import coverage ratio 
(measure of Non-tariff barriers (NTBs)), MPR is the import penetration ratio, GFCF is the 
gross fixed capital formation. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 
respectively. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
Table 3.8: Tariffs and Industry Wage Premia: For Skilled and Unskilled 
Workers  
I II
Skilled Workers Unskilled Workers
NRP 0.229 ** -0.235 ***
(0.108) (0.086)
Year indicators Yes Yes
Industry indicators No No
First differencing Yes Yes
Observations 183 209
 
Notes: Dependent variable in all regressions is the inter-industry wage premium calculated 
from Mincer wage regressions (available from authors upon request). Equation 3.3.2 has been 
estimated here. Mincer wage regressions are done separately for skilled and unskilled 
workers. NRP is the nominal rate of protection. Specification I is for skilled workers only and 
Specification II is for skilled workers only. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 




























Source: Ahluwalia (2000). Gini coefficients are calculated assuming that all individuals within a state 
have a gross income equal to per capita GDP of the state. 
Figure 1.2: Spatial Decomposition of Total Inequality in CEECs 
 
Source: Forster et al. (2005). Theil Index of inequality is decomposed into the between and within 


































































Notes: Data sources on tariffs are Pavcnik et al. (2004) for Brazil ; Goldberg and Pavcnik 
(2005) for Colombia, Das (2003) for India, and Revenga (1997) for Mexcio. 
Figure 1.4: Tariffs: Pre and Post Liberalization 
 



















































































































Notes: Data on import coverage ratio is from Das (2003). Import coverage ratio is defined as 
the share of imports subject to non-tariff barriers. The average import coverage ratios are for 
72 three-digit manufacturing industries classified according to the National Industrial 
























Figure 2.1: Gini Index of Regional Disparities  































Notes: Data for OECD countries is for the year 2002 except for Solvak Republic which is for 




































Round 38 Round 43 Round 50 Round 55
 
Notes: Please refer to footnote 47 to see which regions fall in the various zones. Appendix B 
provides a list of regions in the study. Round 38, 43, 50 and 55 correspond to 1983, 1987-88, 















Figure 2.3: Change in Region Wage Premia between 1983 and 1999-00 and 
Region Wage Premia in 1983. 
 
Notes: Coefficient from the regression of change in wage premia between 1983 and 2000 on 
initial wage premia in 1983 is -0.55. This is statistically significant at the 1% level. 
Figure 3.1: Tariff Reduction and Pre-Liberalization Tariffs 
 
Notes: Data on tariffs is from Das (2003). Coefficient = 0.66 (se=0.09), statistically 
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.5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1
Share of Unskilled Workers in 1983
Tariff Reduction between 1983-84 and 1999-2000 Fitted values
 
Notes: Data on tariffs is from Das (2003). Coefficient=0.71, standard error=0.25, statistically 
significant at 1 percent level, number of observations = 65. Unskilled workers are defined as 
those having less than 12 years of completed schooling. 
Figure 3.3: Tariff Reduction between 1983and 1999-2000 and Industry Wage 












































































-.5 0 .5 1
Industry Wage Premium in 1983
Tariff Reduction between 1983-84 and 1999-2000 Fitted values
 
Notes: Data on tariffs is from Das (2003) and inter-industry wage premium is based on 
authors’ calculations. Coefficient=-0.19, standard error=0.12 (statistically significant at 15 






















































































































































































































-1 -.5 0 .5
Difference in Tariff rates
Difference in Industry wage premiums Fitted values
 
Notes: Data on tariffs is from Das (2003) and inter-industry wage premium is based on author 
calculations. Coefficient=-0.10, standard error=0.02 (statistically significant at 5 percent), 
number of observations = 208. 





















































































































Appendix B: List of Regions 
Region Code Region State Region Code Region State
21 Coastal Andhra Pradesh 141 Coastal Maharashtra
22 Inland Northern Andhra Pradesh 142 Inland Western Maharashtra
23 South Western Andhra Pradesh 143 Inland Northern Maharashtra
24 Inland Southern Andhra Pradesh 144 Inland Central Maharashtra
51 Southern Bihar 145 Inland Eastern Maharashtra
52 Northern Bihar 146 Eastern Maharashtra
53 Central Bihar 191 Coastal Orissa
71 Eastern Gujarat 192 Southern Orissa
72 Plains Northern Gujarat 193 Northern Orissa
73 Plains Southern Gujarat 201 Northern Punjab
74 Dry Areas Gujarat 202 Southern Punjab
75 Saurashtra Gujarat 211 Western Rajasthan
81 Eastern Haryana 212 North Eastern Rajasthan
82 Western Haryana 213 Southern Rajasthan
91 Himachal Pradesh Himachal Pradesh 214 South Eastern Rajasthan
111 Coastal & Ghats Karnataka 231 Coastal Northern Tamil Nadu
112 Inland Eastern Karnataka 232 Coastal Tamil Nadu
113 Inland Southern Karnataka 233 Southern Tamil Nadu
114 Inland Northern Karnataka 234 Inland Tamil Nadu
121 Northern Kerala 251 Himalayan Uttar Pradesh
122 Southern Kerala 252 Western Uttar Pradesh
131 Chhattisgarh Madhya Pradesh 253 Central Uttar Pradesh
132 Vindhya Madhya Pradesh 254 Eastern Uttar Pradesh
133 Central Madhya Pradesh 255 Southern Uttar Pradesh
134 Malwa Madhya Pradesh 261 Himalayan West Bengal
135 South Madhya Pradesh 262 Eastern Plains West Bengal
136 South Western Madhya Pradesh 263 Central Plains West Bengal
137 Northern Madhya Pradesh 264 Western Plains West Bengal
281 Chandigarh Chandigarh
311 Delhi Delhi  




















Appendix C: List of Industries with Tariff Information 
Description of the Industry NIC-87 Description of the Industry NIC-87
Cotton ginning, spinning and bailing 230 Iron and steel in semi-finished form 331
Cotton spinning other than in mills 231 Manufacture of Ferro alloys 332
Weaving and finishing of cotton khadi 232 Copper manufacturing 333
Weaving and finishing of cotton textiles on handlooms 233 Aluminum manufacturing 335
Weaving and finishing of cotton textiles on powerlooms 234 Zinc manufacturing 336
Cotton spinning ,weaving and processing in mills 235 Processing of metal scraps except iron and steel scraps 338
Bleaching, dyeing and pruning of cotton textiles 236 Manufacture of fabricated structural metal products 340
Manufacture of knitted or crocheted textile products 260 Manufacture of fabricated metal products, n.e.c. 341
Embroidery works, zari works and ornamental trimmings 262 Furniture and fixtures primarily of metal 342
Blankets, shawls, carpets, and rugs etc 263 Hand-tools, weights, general hardware, metal products n.e.c. 343
Textile, garments and clothing accessories 265 Manufacture of Metal cutlery, utensils, kitchenware 346
Manufacture of made-up textiles; except apparel 267 Agriculture machinery and equipments and parts thereof 350
Manufacture of waterproof textile fabrics 268 Construction and mining-machinery and equipment 351
Textile products n.e.c. 269 Prime movers, boilers, steam generating plants and nuclear reactors 352
Tanning, curing, finishing, embossing of  leather 290 Food and textile industry machinery 353
Leather Footwear 291 Other Machinery 354
Wearing apparel of leather and substitutes of leather 292 Refrigerators, air conditioners and fire fighting equipment 355
Leather Products and Substitutes 293 General purpose non electrical machinery/equipment 356
Manufacture of leather and fur products n.e.c. 299 Manufacture of machine tools, their parts and accessories 357
Organic and Inorganic Chemicals 300 Office, computing and accounting machinery and parts 358
Manufacture of fertilizers and pesticides 301 Sspecial purpose machinery/equipment, 359
Plastics, synthetic rubber and man-made fibers 302 Electrical industrial machinery, apparatus and parts thereof 360
Paints, varnishes and related products 303 Insulated wires and cables, optical fiber cables 361
Manufacture of drugs, medicines, and allied products 304 Accumulators, primary cells and primary batteries 362
Perfumes, cosmetics, lotions, toothpaste, and soaps etc. 305 Electric lamps, electric fans and domestic appliances 363
Manufacture of matches 307 Apparatus for radio broadcasting, television transmission 365
Manufacture of explosives, ammunition and fire works 308 Electronic valves, tubes and other electronic components n.e.c. 368
Tire and tube industries 310 Radiographic X-ray apparatus etc. and electrical equipment n.e.c. 369
Rubber and Plastic Footwear 311 Ship and boat building 370
Manufacture of rubber product n.e.c. 312 Manufacture of locomotives and parts 371
Manufacture of plastic products n.e.c. 313 Railway/tramway wagons coaches and other railroad equipment n.e.c. 372
Manufacture of refined petroleum product 314 Heavy motor vehicles, coach work, cars and other motor vehicles 374
Manufacture of refined petroleum products n.e.c. 316 Motor-cycles, scooters and parts (including three-wheelers) 375
Manufacture of coke-oven products 318 Manufacture of bicycles, cycle-rickshaws. 376
Manufacture of other coal and coal tar products n.e.c. 319 Manufacture of aircraft, spacecraft and their parts 377
Manufacture of iron and steel in primary/semi finished forms 330 Manufacture of transport and equipment and parts n.e.c. 379




Appendix D: Theoretical framework for a NEG model 
 The theoretical framework used to derive the estimating equation comes from 
the NEG model developed by Krugman and Venables (1995), and the framework 
presented below is as developed by Redding and Venables (2004). Firms are assumed 
to operate under increasing returns to scale with each firm producing a differentiated 
variety. 
Appendix D.1 Consumer’s Problem 
 The model assumes intermediate inputs in production and therefore, the 
demand for the differentiated product of each firm comes not only in the form of final 
good from the consumer but also as an intermediate input from other firms. The 
utility function sU , of a representative consumer in region s, is 
  1s s sU M A
µ µ−=  .      (D.1) 
 Where, sA is the consumption of agricultural good, sM is a sub-utility function 
of manufactured goods, µ  is the share of expenditure on manufactured goods, and 
1 µ− is the share of expenditure on agricultural goods. sM which is a sub utility 
function is in turn defined as  
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 Where, rn  is the number of varieties produced in region r, rsx is the region s 
demand for z-th variety produced in region r, and σ is the elasticity of substitution 
between any two varieties. The second equality comes from the fact that because of 




same quantity. The optimization problem of the consumer is to maximize the utility 
subject to the total income Ys. This gives us the dual to the quantity index in the form 
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 Where, sG  is the price index for manufactures and rsp is the price of individual 
varieties produced in r and sold in s and is defined as  
 rs r rsp p t=         (D.4) 
 Where, rp  is the free-on-board produced price. The transportation cost rst  
takes the form of an iceberg cost as modeled by Samuelson.  This implies that a 




−  are lost in shipping from r to s. Therefore, to 
deliver one unit of good from region r to s must be shipped as only a fraction 
1
rst
arrives. If 1t =  then trade is costless and if t = ∞ there is no trade. 
Appendix D.2 Producer’s Problem 
Turning to the supply side, each representative producer in region s uses a composite 
input ( s s sM l v
α β γ ) of labor (l) which is assumed to be immobile across region, (M) is 
the composite intermediate goods as defined in D.3 and a primary factor of 
production (k) which is mobile across regions (say, capital). The production function 
is given by: 
 ( )s s s s s sM l k c F c x




 Where,α  is the share of the composite intermediate input in the total 
expenditure of the firm, β  is the share of labor, γ  is the share of the mobile primary 
factor of production and it is assumed that 1α β γ+ + =  , csF is the fixed cost of 
setting up a plant and this gives rise to increasing returns to scale.  
 Profit function of the representative firm in region s, is given by 
 ( )
R
s s sr s s s s s
r
p x G w v c F xα β γπ = − +∑      (D.6) 
 The total cost function consists of the fixed cost csF and sc  which is the 
variable cost. The price of the inputs is given by sG which is the price index for 
manufactures as defined before, wage rate in region s is sw . From the profit function 
we can say that lower the price index lower the total cost of production. Further, 
higher number of upstream firms lowers the price index and also the transport costs. 
 The producer’s profit maximization problem, from the usua l marginal revenue 
equal marginal cost, gives the free on board producer price which is a constant mark 
up over marginal cost given by 
 / 1s s s s sp G w v c
α β γ σ σ= −       (D.7) 
 Allowing for free entry and exit, firms break if they produce the level of 
output given by 
 ( 1)sx x F σ= = −        (D.8) 
Appendix D.3 Aggregate Demand 
 Summing up, we get the total demand from each region r for the products 




 1sr sr r rx p E G
σ σ− −=        (D.9) 
 r r r rE Y n P xµ α= +        (D.10)  
 Where rE  is the total expenditure on manufactured goods by region r. As 
mentioned above, demand for the differentiated product comes not only from the 
consumers in the form of final good as given by rYµ  but also from the producers in 
the form of spending on intermediate goods as summarized in r rn P xα   where rn is 
the number of downstream firms in region r. 
Appendix D.4 Wage Equation 
The zero profit wage equa tion is derived by first summing up the demand from all 
regions r for region s products as given by Equation D.8. This gives us 
 1 1( )
R
s r r sr
r
p x E G tσ σ σ− −= ∑       (D.11) 
This along with profit maximizing price as given by Equation D.7 gives us 
 1 1( /( 1)) ( )
R
s s s s r r sr
r
x G w v c E G tα β γ σ σ σσ σ − −− = ∑     (D.12) 
Following Fujita et al. (1999), we call this the wage equation. Rearranging, we can 
write equation as  
 1( ) ( ) ( )s s s s sw v c A SA MA
ασ
β γ σ σ −=      (D.13) 
Where, 
i) 1 1( ) ( )
R
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r r
SA n p t s tσ σ− −
   
= =     
∑ ∑     (D.14) 




capacity of all the regions. Supply capacity as measured by rs is a product of number 
of firms in other regions and their price competitiveness. Supplier access therefore 
measures the proximity of firms in a region to its suppliers. The better the supply 
access, which could be due either to physical proximity or as a result of there being a 
higher number of upstream firms, lower the total costs and higher the zero profit 
wages.  
ii) 1 1 1( ) ( )
R
s r r sr r sr
r r
MA E G t m tσ σ σ− − −
   
= =     
∑ ∑    (D.15) 
gives the market access (MA). Analogous to supplier access it is a distance weighted 
measure of market capacity of all regions. Market capacity rm in turn depends on the 
expenditure and the price index in region r. In other words, market capacity is nothing 
but purchasing power of the region. These two together give the position of the 
demand curve. As with supply access, market access has a positive effect on wages. 
The closer is the firm to its market (market comprising both of consumers and 
downstream firms) the higher is the zero profit wages. 
 From Equation D.13, we therefore have a positive relationship between wages 
in a region and economic geography variables in the form of market access and 
supply access. Taking logs on both sides in Equation D.13, we have: 





















Appendix E: Estimated Region Wage Premia 
Region Round 38 Round 43 Round 50 Round 55 Region Round 38 Round 43 Round 50 Round 55
-0.1751*** -0.2759***-0.1924*** -0.2477*** -0.2013*** 0.0759 -0.3973*** -0.2714***
(0.0477) (0.0582) (0.0484) (0.0628) (0.0613) (0.1056) (0.1178) (0.0805)
0.1236*** -0.1189** -0.0739 -0.0336 -0.0365 -0.0155 -0.0433 -0.1656**
(0.0351) (0.0461) (0.0553) (0.0462) (0.0658) (0.0563) (0.0487) (0.0819)
-0.1241 -0.5151***-0.4480*** -0.3504*** -0.0028 0.2334*** 0.1581** 0.1555
(0.0875) (0.1047) (0.0997) (0.0878) (0.0601) (0.0598) (0.0750) (0.1156)
-0.3740*** -0.5360***-0.0942 -0.4464*** 0.0614 -0.1738** 0.0190 -0.6758***
(0.0974) (0.1020) (0.1278) (0.1537) (0.1023) (0.0722) (0.0906) (0.1172)
0.2301*** 0.2534*** 0.2674** 0.4923*** -0.1132 -0.2765** 0.1050 0.0560
(0.0539) (0.0539) (0.1271) (0.0644) (0.1101) (0.1127) (0.0826) (0.0869)
-0.5757*** 0.0490 0.1728 -0.2720*** 0.4320*** 0.3826*** 0.3480*** 0.2242***
(0.2037) (0.1344) (0.1051) (0.0492) (0.0209) (0.0245) (0.0262) (0.0199)
-0.1404** -0.0245 -0.5759*** -0.2389*** 0.0934*** 0.0198 0.0088 -0.0551
(0.0706) (0.1174) (0.1809) (0.0835) (0.0324) (0.0417) (0.0351) (0.0467)
0.2065 -0.0380 -0.0222 0.0083 -0.3218*** 0.0257 -0.1715* 0.4407**
(0.1568) (0.0795) (0.0921) (0.0753) (0.0686) (0.0598) (0.1038) (0.2199)
0.3367*** 0.1014*** -0.0027 -0.2276*** -0.2227*** -0.2169*** -0.0580 -0.3198**
(0.0313) (0.0364) (0.0437) (0.0367) (0.0653) (0.0792) (0.1096) (0.1433)
0.2295*** 0.1928*** 0.1763*** 0.3421*** -0.2910*** -0.0787 -0.3138*** -0.3915***
(0.0477) (0.0450) (0.0342) (0.0564) (0.0488) (0.0665) (0.0633) (0.0797)
0.0303 0.2166** -0.3935** -0.0651 -0.4098*** -0.0036 -0.0002 0.2340*
(0.0814) (0.0890) (0.1797) (0.0897) (0.1249) (0.1054) (0.1413) (0.1403)
0.2294*** 0.0058 -0.2245*** 0.0997** 0.0824 -0.3041** 0.0738 -0.2022*
(0.0667) (0.0599) (0.0777) (0.0427) (0.1187) (0.1318) (0.1675) (0.1183)
0.1364*** 0.0087 0.2594*** 0.2880*** 0.0353 -0.4252*** 0.3554*** -0.0924
(0.0509) (0.0483) (0.0810) (0.0527) (0.3293) (0.0417) (0.0837) (0.1397)
0.1405** 0.0914 0.0273 -0.0073 0.2231*** 0.2897*** 0.2739*** 0.1650**
(0.0626) (0.1050) (0.2020) (0.1371) (0.0638) (0.0528) (0.0579) (0.0745)
0.4854*** 0.4398*** 0.6485*** 0.3038** 0.0166 0.0197 0.1449*** 0.0549
(0.0902) (0.1663) (0.1256) (0.1417) (0.0565) (0.0542) (0.0540) (0.0394)
-0.0009 -0.2488** 0.4551*** 0.2328** 0.0368 0.1965*** 0.1269** 0.0759
(0.0756) (0.0988) (0.0924) (0.1003) (0.0554) (0.0603) (0.0595) (0.0681)
-0.0541 -0.2345 -0.3187*** -0.1261 0.3264*** 0.2656*** -0.0336 0.0250
(0.1729) (0.1861) (0.1109) (0.1557) (0.0540) (0.0953) (0.0723) (0.0728)
0.0268 -0.0203 0.1344*** 0.0080 -0.0246 -0.0351 -0.0651 0.0676
(0.0419) (0.0392) (0.0403) (0.0411) (0.0509) (0.0655) (0.0788) (0.0772)
-0.0963 -0.2359***-0.3113*** -0.2692*** 0.0463 -0.0142 0.2803 -0.1175
(0.0668) (0.0461) (0.0783) (0.0529) (0.0859) (0.1869) (0.1805) (0.1570)
-0.3132*** -0.3114***-0.0333 -0.1326* -0.0643 0.2939*** 0.1698** 0.0966
(0.0658) (0.0663) (0.0662) (0.0671) (0.0712) (0.0870) (0.0852) (0.1419)
-0.3251*** -0.3936***-0.1723** -0.0855* -0.3565*** -0.2104*** -0.1900*** -0.0680
(0.0517) (0.0796) (0.0714) (0.0466) (0.0374) (0.0439) (0.0373) (0.0423)
0.0446 0.1723*** 0.1824*** -0.2239*** -0.3728*** -0.3354*** -0.0756 -0.2943***
(0.0589) (0.0651) (0.0653) (0.0747) (0.1216) (0.0708) (0.0963) (0.0797)
0.1094 -0.2196 0.0534 0.0119 -0.5150*** -0.5258*** -0.3450*** -0.3232***
























































Appendix E: Estimated Region Wage Premia (...contd.) 
 
Region Round 38 Round 43 Round 50 Round 55
-0.2558*** -0.1749***-0.2405*** -0.0400
(0.0418) (0.0461) (0.0549) (0.0374)
-0.2205*** -0.1238 0.1384 -0.3114
(0.0706) (0.1290) (0.0916) (0.2579)
-0.0412 -0.0790** -0.0068 -0.1271***
(0.0396) (0.0398) (0.0574) (0.0318)
-0.0392 0.0780 0.0478 -0.4269***
(0.0574) (0.0523) (0.0428) (0.0773)
-0.2541*** -0.1516** 0.1858*** -0.0771
(0.0676) (0.0607) (0.0671) (0.0799)
-0.5013*** -0.2902***-0.1767 -0.2817***
(0.1244) (0.0779) (0.1262) (0.0910)
0.0005 -0.3942***-1.2398 -0.5145
(0.1601) (0.1275) (0.7716) (0.3735)
-0.6091*** -0.5460***-0.4462*** -0.5399***
(0.1155) (0.1145) (0.0764) (0.1431)
0.0393 0.1079** 0.0021 0.0779***
(0.0250) (0.0412) (0.0449) (0.0293)
-0.2945** -0.3375 -0.1229 0.3426***
(0.1163) (0.2966) (0.1056) (0.1132)
0.2719** 0.1678 0.1954*** 0.1942***
(0.1061) (0.1597) (0.0654) (0.0723)
0.3021*** 0.2234*** -0.0649 0.1905***

















Appendix F: Estimated Industry Wage Premia 




































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix F: Estimated Industry Wage Premia (...contd.) 






























































































































































































 1983 1987-88 1993-94 1999-00 
F-statistic F(181, 9085)=8.3 F(179, 8862)=7.63 F(185, 8340)=5.06 F(149, 7661)=5.64 
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Standard deviation 0.28 0.34 0.28 0.24 
 
***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent, respectively. The 
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